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Abstract
This Comment contends that the Supreme Court’s holding in Sale was erroneous because
the 1967 Protocol and customary international human rights law mandate that non-refoulement
apply to all refugees regardless of location. Part I describes the historical background of the
1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the INA as they relate to non-refoulement. Part I also
discusses the U.S. government’s interdiction program against Haitian migrants and the human
rights conditions in Haiti as they existed from the start of the interdiction program in 1982 to
the present. Part II examines Sale and sets forth the procedural history of the case, the facts, the
positions of the parties, and the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Part III analyzes the Supreme
Court’s decision, proposes additional issues that the Court should have considered, and argues that
the Supreme Court should have held that President Bush’s order violated both the 1967 Protocol
and customary international human rights law. This Comment concludes that Sale does not reflect
contemporary refugee law, and therefore, should be rejected by other nations facing similar refugee
situations.
COMMENTS
SALE v. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL:
THE RETURN OF HAITIAN REFUGEES
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, there were nearly twenty million refugees world-
wide.1 These refugees sought safety in countries other than those
of their nationality or usual residence in an effort to escape per-
secution.2 Despite the desperate plight of these refugees, neigh-
boring states often considered responsibility for them too bur-
densome and were therefore reluctant to accept them.3
1. Stanley Meisler, UN Reports Asylum Crisis for Refugees, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at
A4. This statistic refers to those fleeing persecution, civil wars and other violence. Id.
In the following year, 1993, 150,386 people from 154 countries applied to the United
States for asylum as refugees. Tim Weiner, U.S. to Charge Immigrants a Fee When They Seek
Political Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1994, at Al, D22. Of the 18,100 applications
processed in 1993, approximately 5,100 were approved out. Id. at Al.
Subsequent use of the word "refugee" in this note shall refer to those people who
meet the definition provided in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152 (defining "refugee") [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
Those individuals not meeting the definition or groups including refugees and non-
refugees will be called "migrants" or "immigrants."
The Convention's definition of "refugee" is found in Article 1, which provides that:
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply
to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization ....
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id., 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 138.
2. Meisler, supra note 1, at A4. The standard used by the United States Immigra-
tion Service considers an alien to be a refugee if the alien is outside the country of his
nationality due to persecution or due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis
of race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social groups, or political opin-
ion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
3. John Hurst, EC Cracks Down on Refugees, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Dec. 2, 1992, at 12;
France to take in 300 Bosnian Prisoners, Reuter Newswire, Oct. 28, 1992, available in
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Since World War II, however, signatories of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the
"1951 Convention") have been obligated to accept refugees.4
According to Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, nations may
not "expel or return ('refouler') a refugee" to any territory
where he or she would be endangered.5 The verb "refouler" and
the noun "refoulement" describe the act of returning refugees
to a place where they may be persecuted. 6 "Non-refoulement" is
the concept of forbidding refoulement.7 Since implementation
of the 1951 Convention in 1954, the policy of non-refoulement,
or non-return, has been the single most important protection
for refugees.8
Nearly thirty-five years after the 1951 Convention became
effective, 9 U.S. President George Bush demonstrated the United
States' reluctance to comply with the non-refoulement policy af-
ter thousands of Haitians fled Haiti for the United States.' In
1982, President Bush's predecessor, U.S. President Ronald Rea-
gan, had instituted an interdiction program compelling the U.S.
Coast Guard to stop Haitian boats in international waters before
they reached U.S. territory." This interdiction program com-
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS file; 'Something Must Be Done,' But What? - Helping the Refugees -
Attempts to Find a Solution, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 5, 1992, available in WESTLAW, INT-
NEWS file; Ship Carrying Somali Refugees Runs Aground Leaving Aden, MIDDLE E. ECON.
Di., July 3, 1992, at 26, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS file; Antoinette de Jong &
Juliet Peck, A Victory Without Any Peace, WoRLD PREss REv., Aug. 1993, at 18 (stating that
"Pakistanis are unhappy about the endless economic burden of the refugees" from Af-
ghanistan).
4. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (setting
forth signatories' obligations toward refugees); GUNNEL STENBERG, NoN-EXPULSION AND
NoN-REFOULEMENT 59 (1989) (describing 1951 Convention).
5. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at
176.
6. Sophie H. Pirie, Note, The Need for a Codified Definition of 'Persecution' in United
States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REv. 187, 187 n.3 (1986).
7. Id.; see Robert Suro, Haitians' Plight Illuminates Volatile Nature of U.S. Policy, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 29, 1994, at A8 (defining "non-refoulement" as the principle that "[i]t is
wrong to return people to places where they are likely to suffer persecution.").
8. See STENBERG, supra note 4, at 171 ("[T]he concept constitutes the very heart of
international refugee law, since it may be maintained that nothing is more important to
a refugee than protection against persecution.").
9. See 1951 Convention, supra note I (indicating that it would take effect in 1954).
10. See Thomas L. Friedman, Haitians Returned Under New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1992, at Al.
11. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 180, 180-81 (1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1988) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,324]. Ironically, during 1981, the
United States admitted a total of 139,294 refugees and "displaced persons" from South
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plied with the 1951 Convention's non-refoulement provision 12
because the United States arranged to return all of the migrants
to Haiti, with the exception of those Haitians determined to be
refugees.13 In 1992, however, President Bush eliminated the ex-
ception for refugees found on the high seas, and thus ignored
the government's non-refoulement policy. 4 President Bush ar-
gued that the 1951 Convention did not apply to refugees on the
high seas because they were outside U.S. territory.1 5
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,16 organizations repre-
senting the Haitians challenged President Bush's new policy.17
These organizations argued that President Bush's policy violated
the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (the "1967 Protocol") 8 by which the United States
agreed to abide by the 1951 Convention, 19  and section
243(h) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the
"INA") which implements the non-refoulement principle. 20 The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld President Bush's interdiction pro-
East Asia, and an additional 14,769 from other areas of the world. Report on UNHCR
Assistance Activities in 1981-1982 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for
1993, 33d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/606 (1982).
12. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
See Exec. Order No. 12,324, supra note 11, 3 C.F.R. at 181 (providing that no refugee
could be returned without first giving his consent). However, it is notable that between
1981, when the interdiction began, and 1991, only 11 Haitians out of the 24,000
stopped were allowed to pursue asylum claims further. Amy Wilentz, Deep Voodoo; Bush
Administration's Haiti Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1992, at 18.
13. Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes Regarding Migrants and Interdic-
tion, Sept. 23,1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241 [hereinafter Interdic-
tion Letters].
14. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 3 C.F.R. 303 (1993), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1993) (revising interdiction program); Bernard Diederich, Send 'Em Back, TIME, June
8, 1992, at 43.
15. Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 14, 3 C.F.R. at 303.
16. - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
17. Id. The respondents in Sale include the National Coalition for Haitian Refu-
gees, Inc., and the Immigration Law Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Or-
ganization of New Haven, Connecticut, which represented interdicted and detained
migrants and individual "screened-in," "screened-out" Haitians, and their relatives. See
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853, *1
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992), aff'd in part, vacated in part, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v.
McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom, Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
18. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
19. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
649 U.N.T.S. 372 (adding United States to Protocol adherents).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Brief for Respondent, McNary v. Hai-
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gram, returning the Haitian refugees to their homeland, and
noted that it was enforceable because neither the 1951 Conven-
tion, the 1967 Protocol, nor section 243(h) (1) of the INA, was
intended to apply beyond U.S. territory."'
This Comment contends that the Supreme Court's holding
in Sale was erroneous because the 1967 Protocol and customary
international human rights law mandate that non-refoulement
apply to all refugees regardless of location. Part I describes the
historical background of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Proto-
col, and the INA as they relate to non-refoulement. Part I also
discusses the U.S. government's interdiction program against
Haitian migrants and the human rights conditions in Haiti as
they existed from the start of the interdiction program in 1982
to the present. Part II examines Sale and sets forth the proce-
dural history of the case, the facts, the positions of the parties,
and the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Part III analyzes the
Supreme Court's decision, proposes additional issues that the
Court should have considered, and argues that the Supreme
Court should have held that President Bush's order violated
both the 1967 Protocol and customary international human
rights law. This Comment concludes that Sale does not reflect
contemporary refugee law, and therefore, should be rejected by
other nations facing similar refugee situations.
I. U.S. REFUGEE LAW AND THE INTERDICTION PROGRAM
The 1951 Convention expressly prohibits the refoulement
of refugees.22 Although the United States did not accede to the
1951 Convention, the United States did agree to the 1967 Proto-
tian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344), available in
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
21. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2562.
22. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
Article 33 provides that:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the commu-
nity of that country. No reservations to Article 33 are allowed.
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col that incorporates the terms of the 1951 Convention by refer-
ence and expands the application of the 1951 Convention.2 3 Be-
cause the 1967 Protocol is not self-executing, the United States
Congress subsequently enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 (the
"Refugee Act") .24 The Refugee Act enables the United States to
comply with the 1967 Protocol and to provide expanded protec-
tion to refugees fleeing human rights violations in other na-
tions. 25 While all nations have a duty to protect human rights
under international law,26 citizens of Haiti have been subject to
countless human rights violations over the past thirty-five years. 7
However, in 1982, two years after the Refugee Act was enacted,
President Reagan implemented a program designed to stop the
large numbers of Haitians fleeing Haiti for the United States.28
While President Reagan's program protected those Haitians de-
termined to be refugees, 29 and thus complied with Article 33 of
the 1951 Convention,30 President Bush subsequently changed
the interdiction program by ordering that all Haitians be re-
turned to Haiti regardless of their refugee status.3 1 Although
President Bill Clinton, President Bush's successor, restored the
protection offered refugees, he maintained the United States'
position that the 1951 Convention does not apply to refugees on
the high seas.32
23. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 18.
24. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 107(2) (1980)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
25. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (setting forth definition of refugee).
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701 (1986) ("A state
is obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction . . . ."); id.
§ 701 cmt. e ("The United States is bound by the international customary law of
human rights."); id. § 206 ("A state's duties are the obligations imposed on it by inter-
national law or agreement.").
27. See generally Mark D. Danner, The Struggle for a Democratic Haiti, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., June 21, 1987, at 39 (presenting history of Haiti).
28. See Exec. Order No. 12,324, supra note 11, 3 C.F.R. at 181 (implementing in-
terdiction program).
29. Id.; see supra note 1 (presenting definition of refugee).
30. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176;
see supra note 22 (quoting Article 33 of the 1951 Convention).
31. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 14, 3 C.F.R. at 303 (ordering return of
all migrants regardless of asylum claims).
32. U.S. Department of State, Press Release, May 13, 1994, at 3 (on file with The
Fordham International Law Journal); Gwen Ifill, Clinton Grants Haitian Exiles Hearings at
Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at Al; Telephone Interview with Ellen Engles, Haiti Work-
ing Group, U.S. Department of State (May 16, 1994).
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A. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol
The vast displacement of people following World War I and
World War II raised awareness of the need to protect refugees
and led states to draft the 1951 Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees.3" The growth of the fascist regimes in Spain,
Italy, and Nazi Germany, coupled with the outbreak of World
War II, forced many from their home countries.3 4 By the end of
World War II, the number of refugees had increased dramati-
cally.3 5 As a result, many states throughout Europe were over-
whelmed with refugees.3 6
Prior to the 1951 Convention, no existing international in-
struments satisfactorily addressed a refugee problem of this mag-
nitude.37 As a result, in 1948, the United Nations Economic and
Social Committee requested that a study on refugees be con-
33. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS
HISTORY, CONTENTS, INTERPRETATION 1 (1953); see, e.g., supra note I (quoting Article
(1)(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention). Article I(B) of the Convention states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before I
January 1951" in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either
(a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or
(b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951";
and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature,
ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the
purpose of its obligations under this Convention.
1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. I(B), 19 U.S.T. at 6262, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
34. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 2.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 2-3.
37. Id. Most of the existing agreements, promulgated between the wars, dealt with
providing documents to facilitate refugee travel and did not address how nations were
to treat refugees. Id. at 1-2. Furthermore, the agreements only applied to specifically
named groups of refugees. Id. As a result, there were many refugees to whom none of
the agreements applied. Id. Some of agreements include: the Arrangement relating to
the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, May 12, 1926, 89
L.N.T.S. 47, to which 23 states subscribed; the Arrangement Concerning the extension
to other Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures taken in favor of Russian and Ar-
menian Refugees, June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 63, which added Assyrians, Assyro-Chalde-
ans and Turks; and the Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees,
Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199, which only involved refugees involved in the later trea-
ties and which was only adopted by eight states. The only two post-World War Two
agreements were similarly limited. See Agreement on Refugees from the U.K. Occupied
Area, Feb. 11, 1945 159 S.U.S.T. 173, 174 (restricting application to areas occupied by
United Kingdom); Agreement on Refugee Travel Documents, Oct. 15, 1946, 11
U.N.T.S. 73 (providing for issuing of travel papers to refugees).
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ducted.38 This study resulted in the appointment of an ad hoc
committee of representatives from thirteen nations who worked
together to draft the 1951 Convention. 39 The committee submit-
ted its draft to a conference of delegates from twenty-six states
who ultimately adopted the 1951 Convention.40 The preamble
to the 1951 Convention indicated how it was more expansive
than previous agreements in addressing the issue of refugees.4"
Unlike previous treaty provisions that adopted a non-refoule-
ment policy limited to specific situations,42 the 1951 Convention,
through Articles 1 and 33(1), expressly provides a broad applica-
tion. Article 1 states that the Convention shall apply to all refu-
gees of events occurring before 1951.43 Article 33(1) of the 1951
Convention 44 states that no signatory shall "expel or return
('refouler') a refugee" to the borders of a territory where his life
or freedom would be endangered due to religious, ethnic, or
political persecution.45 Therefore, article 33(1) of the 1951
Convention applies to all persons who have become refugees by
38. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 3-4; E.S.C. Res. 116, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Supp.
No. 4D (1948).
39. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 4.
40. Id. at 5.
41. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl., 19 U.S.T. at 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
According to the preamble, "it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous interna-
tional agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and the
protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement." Id.
42. See, e.g., Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees coming
from Germany, July 4, 1936, 171 L.N.T.S. 75 (addressing only refugees from Nazi Ger-
many). This treaty says:
Article 4(2): Without prejudice to the measures which may be taken
within the country, refugees who have been authorized to reside in a country
may not be subjected by the authorities of that country to measures of expul-
sion or be sent back across the frontier unless such measures are dictated by
reasons of national security or public order.
(3) Even in this last-mentioned case the Governments undertake that ref-
ugees shall not be sent back across the frontier of the Reich unless they have
been warned and have refused to make the necessary arrangements to pro-
ceed to another country or to take advantage of the arrangements made for
them with that object.,
Id.; see also Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, Feb.
10, 1938, art. 5(2), 192 L.N.T.S 59, 67 (providing essentially same protection but using
term "reconduction" instead of "send back").
43. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 138;
see supra note I (quoting Article 1 (A)); see also supra note 33 (quoting Article 1(B)).
44. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (emphasizing importance of Article
33).
45. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
See supra note 22 (quoting Article 33 of 1951 Convention).
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virtue of events occurring prior to 1951.46 In addition, unlike
previous refugee treaties that had been adopted by very few
states,47 the 1951 Convention has been adopted by over 145 na-
tions.48
The United States was involved in the drafting of the 1951
Convention, but did not accede to it until 1968 when it became a
party to the 1967 Protocol. 49 The Protocol modified the scope
and purpose of the 1951 Convention. 0 While Article 1 of the
1951 Convention limited the treaty's scope to persons who be-
came refugees as a result of events occurring prior to 1951 in
Europe,5" the 1967 Protocol cited the development of new refu-
gee problems worldwide and removed the limitations of Article
1.52 The 1967 Protocol thus expanded the 1951 Convention to
apply to all refugees regardless of where or when they fled.53
The 1967 Protocol, however, did not alter the text of Article 33
governing refoulement.54
B. Interpreting the 1967 Protocol and the 1957 Convention
U.S. courts have utilized various methods of interpretation
46. See supra note 22 (presenting text of Article 33(1)).
47. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 4.
48. PETER H. ROHN, 3 WORLD TRE.A-y INDEx 635-36, 1394-95 (2d ed. 1983) (listing
accession of nations to either Convention or Protocol).
49. See supra note 19 (setting forth treaty that added United States to Protocol
adherents).
50. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268-
70; see also supra note 48 (describing wide accession to Protocol and Convention).
51. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at
138.
52. 1967 Protocol, supra 18, pmbl., 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. Accord-
ing to the Preamble:
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at
Geneva on 28 July 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) covers
only those persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951,
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention
was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the
scope of the Convention,
Considering that it is desirable that equal status be enjoyed by all refugees
covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 Jan-
uary 1951 ....
Id.; see supra note 1 (quoting Article l(A)(2)).
53. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268,
270.
54. Id.
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to examine the 1967 Protocol and the 1951 Convention.55
When interpreting the 1967 Protocol and the 1951 Convention,
U.S. courts have sought to construe both in a manner consistent
with the signatories' intent.56 Several U.S. courts have noted
that when a court analyzes an international agreement, it should
first examine the text and the context in which the words at issue
are used. Though no standard procedure for interpreting a
treaty exists,5 the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations
(the "Restatement"), 9 the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, (the "Vienna Convention"),60 commentators, and U.S.
55. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
437-38 (1987) (using history of 1967 Protocol); Fatin v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1993) (using negotiating history of 1951 Con-
vention to interpret 1967 Protocol); Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1350, 1360-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering plain language of text of Article 33 of 1951
Convention and "preparatory and conclusory circumstances"), rev'd sub nom. Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Dwomoh v. Sava, 695
F. Supp. 970, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (using history of definition of "refugee" as used in
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
56. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (observing duty to construe
treaty in a manner consistent with drafters' intent); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090
(2d Cir. 1977) (observing duty to construe treaty in a manner consistent with drafters'
intent); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975) (observing duty to
construe treaty in a manner consistent with drafters' intent), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976); see supra note 55 (indicating previous methods used to interpret 1967 Protocol
and 1951 Convention).
57. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988);
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522,
534 (1987); Saks, 470 U.S. at 397. The International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") has
also emphasized first examining the text of an agreement when attempting to interpret
it. As the ICJ has observed:
The cardinal rule of interpretation that this court has stated should be
applied is that words are to be read... in their ordinary and natural sense. If
so read they make sense, that is the end of the matter. If, however, so read
they are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then and then only
must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain
what the parties really meant when they used the words under consideration.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151, 184 (July 20) (separate opin-
ion of Judge Spender).
58. EDWARD SLAVKO YAMBRUSIC, TREATY INTERPRETATION: THEORY AND REALITY 26-
27 (1987) ("American courts have rejected the notion of the 'rules' of interpretation as
obligatory legal norms... [but] United States courts use the text of a treaty as a point of
departure in the interpretative process."); GYORGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS OF THE LAw OF TREATIES 80 (1973) ("No hierarchical order can be estab-
lished for the various methods of treaty interpretation.").
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26.
60. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92.
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case law indicate that U.S. courts should first analyze a treaty's
text in an effort to discern a treaty's meaning.6" The Vienna
Convention further provides that a court may only adopt a spe-
cial interpretation of a text, different from the plain meaning, if
the court can establish that the parties so intended.62
These four sources state that where the plain language of a
treaty is ambiguous, a court should resort to other methods of
determining the drafters' intent.6" The Vienna Convention, for
instance, makes clear that a court must refer to the agreement's
negotiating history or preparatory documents if the plain mean-
ing of the text is not clear.64 It is also necessary to consider the
historical context of a treaty, the treaty's general purpose, the
parties' intention,65 the general tenor and atmosphere of the
treaty, and the circumstances under which it was concluded.66
All of these factors illuminate the character of a treaty and indi-
cate whether it should be interpreted strictly or liberally.67 The
Restatement, the Vienna Convention, commentary, and Ameri-
61. YAMBRusic, supra note 58, at 19-27. See Eastern, 499 U.S. 530, 534 ("When inter-
preting a treaty, we 'begin with the text of the treaty....'") (quoting Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (observing that Court "must... be governed by the text" where it
does not lead to absurd results); In Re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 72-73 (1821)
(observing importance of following terms as written by contracting parties); Block v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 1967) (relying on "bind-
ing meaning of the terms"); Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide and Boom Co., 52
F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1931) (indicating by example use of text as foundation for analysis).
62. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31(4), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at
692. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts
have relied upon it and the U.S. Department of State has recognized that the Vienna
Convention represents customary international law. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v.
McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nora. Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); JOSEPH SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 993-94 (3d ed. 1988).
63. See Eastern, 499 U.S. at 530 (using historical context in which Warsaw Conven-
tion was drafted); see supra note 57 (quoting International Court of Justice on treaty
interpretation); Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 699-700; Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534;
Saks 470 U.S. at 397; Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8
I.L.M. at 692; P.K MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, 71-72 (1992); YAMBRUSIC, supra note 58, at 20.
64. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 692.
65. MENON, supra note 63, at 71-72.
66. Id. at 76; YAMBRUSIC, supra note 58, at 19.
67. YAMBRUSIC, supra note 58, at 20. See Certain Expenses of the U.N., 1962 I.CJ.
at 44 (separate opinion ofJudge Spender) (finding that Charter of United Nations has
"organic character" after interpretation using plain language, history, intent, and other
factors).
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can case law provide a framework in which the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol can be interpreted.68 Both treaties have
been interpreted in light of these factors.6 9
C. U.S. Statutory Provisions for Implementing the 1967 Protocol
Application of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
in the United States is accomplished through the Immigration
and Nationality Act.70 The INA, enacted in 1951, governs treat-
ment of aliens in the United States.71 However, the INA pre-
cedes the United States' accession to the 1967 Protocol, and
therefore, does not comply with the obligations imposed by the
1967 Protocol and the 1951 Convention, which the 1967 Proto-
col incorporates. 72 Because the 1967 Protocol was not self-exe-
cuting,73 the U.S. Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 to
amend the INA and to conform U.S. law to the 1967 Protocol. 4
The Refugee Act amended the INA by making two changes
to section 243(h) (1) of the INA.75 Prior to amendment, section
243(h) (1) of the INA gave the U.S. Attorney General the power
to protect refugees who were "within the United States" by
preventing their deportation, and thereby allowing them to re-
68. See supra note 63 (citing Restatement, Vienna Convention, commentary, and
case law).
69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (indicating use of factors to interpret
1967 Convention and 1951 Protocol).
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (setting forth section 243 of INA).
71. 8 U.S.C. (1988).
72. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-412, 66 Stat. 166 (1952)
(setting forth Immigration and Nationality Act prior to 1980 amendments).
73. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that 1967
Protocol's "provisions were not themselves a source of rights under [U.S.] law unless
and until Congress implemented them by appropriate legislation."). A self-executing
treaty provides individuals with judicially enforceable rights and is considered to be
fully implemented without requiring any additional legislation by Congress. Russell G.
Donaldson, Annotation, United Nations Resolution as Judicially Enforceable in United States
Domestic Courts, 42 A.L.R. FED. 577, 578 (1993) (discussing self-executing treaties).
74. Sava, 684 F.2d at 218.
75. Refugee Act, supra note 24. Prior to the amendments, § 243(h) (1) provided
that:
[t]he Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he
deems to be necessary for such reason.
Pub. L. No. 414, § 243, 66 Stat. 214 (1952) (prior to 1980 amendment of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1)); see supra note 22 (quoting Article 33 of 1951 Convention).
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main in the United States. 76 The amendments made protection
mandatory and expanded the category of refugees who could be
protected, first, by removing the phrase "within the United
States," and second, by adding a new prohibition on "return" to
the existing reference to "deportation."77 The changes were
necessary because the INA traditionally distinguishes between
two categories of aliens:78 (1) excludable aliens, 79 and (2) expel-
lable or deportable aliens.80 The difference between aliens sub-
ject to exclusion and those subject to expulsion or deportation
exists in their immigration status and in the due process rights
accorded aliens in administrative proceedings.8 " Those aliens
seeking admission at the U.S. border and those paroled 2 into
the United States while their applications are evaluated are sub-
ject to exclusion from the United States, if they are subsequently
76. Id. The Attorney General is responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration laws.
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988). This section states that "[t]he Attorney General shall be
charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens .... " Id.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). According to the amended
§ 243(h) (1):
[t] he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien.., to a country if
the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id.
78. See generally Gerard M. Kouri, Jr., Comment, Getting Back In: The Plasencia Deci-
sion and the Permanent Resident Alien's Right to Procedural Due Process, 36 U. MtAii L. REv.
969 (1982) (discussing differences between deportation hearings and exclusion pro-
ceedings).
79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988) (presenting general classes of excludable aliens)
80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) (presenting general classes of deportable aliens).
The Supreme Court has defined "exclusion" as "preventing someone from entering the
United States who is actually outside of the United States or is treated as being so."
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.4 (1953). The Court defined "expul-
sion" as the act of "forcing someone out of the United States who is actually within the
United States or is treated as being so." Id.
81. Kwong, 344 U.S. at 596-98; Kouri, supra note 78, at 977-99. Both exclusion and
expulsion can result in "deportation." Id. at 977; Kwong, 344 U.S. at 596, n.4 (defining
generic act of deportation as "the moving of someone away from the United States,
after his exclusion or expulsion."). However, in practice, the hearing by which an alien
is excluded is known as an "exclusion proceeding," and only the hearing for expulsion
is called a "deportation hearing." Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988) ("Exclusion of aliens-
Proceedings"); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988) ("proceedings to determine deportability").
82. Nancy A. Norfolk, Comment, Immigration Law - Exclusion of Aliens, 14 SuFFoLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 300 n.1 (1990). Parole entry enables an alien at the border to physi-
cally enter the United States while being officially treated as if the alien was still at the
border. Id.
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denied refugee status.8 3 In contrast, those aliens who have been
admitted into the United States, or who have illegally entered,
are subject to expulsion or deportation.84
Aliens subject to expulsion or deportation are entitled to a
deportation hearing before the Board of Immigration because,
under the INA, they are "within the United States."85 In a depor-
tation hearing, the government bears the burden of proof,86 and
the alien may appeal to a federal court of appeals.87 In an exclu-
sion proceeding, however, the alien is not officially "within the
United States" regardless of physical location. 8 In an exclusion
proceeding, the alien bears the burden of proof8 9 and may only
seek review by writ of habeas corpus.90 Prior to the Refugee Act
of 1980, the Attorney General did not have the authority to pro-
tect those excludable aliens determined to be refugees because
section 243(h) (1) of the INA only applied to those "within the
United States."91 By removing the phrase "within the United
States," Congress enabled U.S. law to protect those aliens who
are seeking admission as well as those who have already en-
tered.92 Since amendment, section 243(h) (1) of the INA has
been interpreted to embody the terms of the 1967 Protocol and
83. Kouri, supra note 78, at 977; Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations:
A Critique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687, 699 n.91
(1993). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (A) (1988), section 212(d) (5) (A) of the INA, the
Attorney General has authority to "parol" an alien into the United States. Norfolk,
supra note 82, at 303 n.14.
84. Kouri, supra note 78, at 977; Lennox, supra note 83, at 699.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988); Kouri, supra note 78, at 977. See supra note 80
(providing U.S. Supreme Court's definition of expulsion and exclusion). For example,
in an exclusion proceeding the alien has the burden of proving that he is entitled to
admission. Kouri, supra note 78, at 977 n.45. In contrast, in a deportation hearing, the
alien is presumed to have a right to stay in the United States and the government bears
the burden of rebutting that presumption. Id. Furthermore, an alien who is to be
deported may appeal a Board of Immigration decision to a federal court of appeals,
whereas an excludable alien may only seek review by seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Id.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1981)
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988).
88. Id.; see supra note 80 (defining exclusion).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1988).
91. 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1952), amended 1980.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 30 (1979) (indicating that
amendment will "require ... the Attorney General to withhold deportation of aliens
who qualify as refugees and who are in exclusion as well as deportation, proceedings").
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Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. 9
D. International Law and Haitian Human Rights
Under treaties like the 1967 Protocol and the 1951 Conven-
tion, as well as under customary international law, human rights
are internationally protected.94 Yet, despite international efforts
to protect human rights, Haitian citizens have long been subject
to human rights violations by Haiti's government and military.95
The human rights situation in Haiti has led to mass migrations
over the past fifteen years.96
1. The Protection of Human Rights and Customary
International Law
Nations have acknowledged many human rights and as-
sumed the duty to respect them in numerous treaties, conven-
tions, and agreements as well as under customary international
law.97 Among the rights now protected by treaty are the right to
93. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (1993);
Haitian Refugee Centers, Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J.,
concurring) (observing that Refugee Act of 1980 incorporated obligation of non-
refoulement provided in 1967 protocol); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 17-
18 (1979);
94. See, e.g., 1951 Convention, supra note 1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; 1967
Protocol, supra note 18, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; MENON, supra note 63, at 121
(indicating customary international law forbidding slavery); see also supra note 26 (indi-
cating acknowledgement of international law of human rights); A.H. ROBERTSON &J.G.
MEluus, HumraN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 286-87 (1989); North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 44 (explaining development of customary international law). A
principle attains customary international law status when it achieves general interna-
tional acceptance and nations adhere to the principle due to a sense of legal compul-
sion. Id.
95. Joseph P. Treaster, Human Rights in Haiti: A PNomise Unfulfilled, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 29, 1984, at Al.
96. Don Bohning, Haitians Flee Poverty, Echo of Soldies' Boots, Flood of Refugees Unlikely
to End Soon, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 26, 1991, at All ("Desperation and fear are
leading poor Haitians out to sea in leaky and overloaded boats as the political crisis in
their homeland remains unresolved and an appalling economic situation worsens.").
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, § 701 cmt. b; see id. § 102 rep's note 7,
("There is now substantial international law on human rights."). The United States also
has many statutory provisions requiring the government to respect and observe human
rights. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), 262d-1, 2151n(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requir-
ing abstention from behavior that would assist nations violating human rights); 7 U.S.C.
§ 17330) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (prohibiting nations engaging in torture and other
human rights violations from receiving agricultural and other forms of foreign aid); 12
U.S.C. §§ 635(b)(1)(B), 635i-8(c)(4) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requiring abstention
from behavior that would assist nations violating human rights); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2432(a),
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be free from torture98 and slavery,99 to be protected from geno-
cide,"°° to be free from racial discrimination, 10 as well as reli-
gious or political persecution. 10 2 International treaties including
the 1951 Convention,10 3 the 1984 Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment 10 4 (the "Convention Against Torture"), and numerous ex-
tradition treaties' 0 5 protect specific rights and enshrine the be-
lief that human rights and freedoms must be protected.1
0 6
The Convention Against Torture and extradition treaties,
for example, demonstrate how human rights have been pro-
tected by international agreement. Both the Convention
Against Torture and extradition treaties include provisions that
protect several human rights including protection from political
persecution, torture, and other forms of punishment. As part of
the Convention Against Torture's prohibition on inhuman acts,
Article 3 (1) of this Convention provides that no signatory nation
may "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite" an individual to an-
2439(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (requiring abstention from behavior that would assist
nations violating human rights). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
(prohibiting United States from providing "security assistance ... to any country the
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights."); 22 U.S.C. 2304(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (di-
recting U.S. President to "formulate and conduct international security assistance pro-
grams... in a manner which will promote and advance human rights ....").
98. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 3d Comm., Agenda
Item 99, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/L.40 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Tor-
ture].
99. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat.
2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
100. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
101. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
102. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
103. See id. (indicating Article 33 protection for refugees).
104. Convention Against Torture, supra note 98.
105. Extradition Treaty between Republic of Philippines and Republic of Indone-
sia, Feb. 10, 1976, arts. 5, 10, 1031 U.N.T.S. 225, 241-42; Supplement to 1909 Extradi-
tion Convention, Apr. 3, 1971, art. 4, U.S.-Fr., 791 U.N.T.S. 273, 276, 278; Treaty on
Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June, 27, 1962, art.3(1), BeIg.-
Lux.-Neth., 616 U.N.T.S. 79, 82; Convention for Extradition and Judicial Assistance in
Criminal Matters, Feb. 27, 1959, art. 3, Belg.-Morocco, 390 U.N.T.S. 275, 283; Agree-
ment for the Extradition of fugitive criminals, Feb. 23, 1960, art 14, 385 U.N.T.S. 39, 44.
106. Marion's Case, 175 C.L.R. 218, 266 & n.69 (Austl. 1992); Anthony D'Amato,
The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. Rav. 1110, 1127-28
(1982).
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other country where there is a substantial risk that the individual
will be tortured.1 1 7 Extradition treaties also contain provisions
that protect human rights and often prohibit extradition for
political offenses or offenses for which the extraditee could be
subject to capital punishment.10 8
Furthermore, customary international law also requires na-
tions, without regard to their treaty obligations, to respect
human rights.109 Many of the rights first protected by treaty are
now also protected under customary international law.110 Cus-
107. Convention Against Torture, supra note 98, art. 3, 23 I.L.M. at 1028, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/39/L.40 at 4. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture states
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations in-
cluding, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Id.
108. See supra note 105 (listing extradition treaties which contain prohibitions on
extradition for political and capital punishment offenses). Article 7 of the Agreement
for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals between Sweden and Israel states:
1. A person claimed shall not be extradited if the offence in respect of
which his extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of
a political character or if he proves that the request for his extradition has, in
fact, been made with a view to trying or punishing him for an offence of a
political character.
2. Extradition shall likewise not be granted if the requested Party has sub-
stantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been made
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person claimed because of his
race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position
may be prejudiced for any of the said reasons.
Agreement for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals between Sweden and Israel,
Sept. 10, 1963, art. 7, 516 U.N.T.S. 3, 19, 21. Santo F. Russo, Comment, In Re Extradition
of Khaled Mohammed ElJassem: The Demise of the Political Offense Provision in U.S.-Italian
Relations, 16 FoRDH.sA INT'L L.J. 1253, 1264 (1993) ("The political offense exception is
a standard clause in extradition treaties . . .).
109. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168, 218-20 (Austl. 1982) (Stephen,
J., dissenting); Helton, The Mandate of US. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under
International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE LJ. 2335, 2336 ("While sometimes idealistic,
the existence of international customary legal norms relating the rights of individuals,
as well as treaties according such rights, have increasingly given rise to the prospect of
judicially enforceable international human rights law."); see D'Amato, supra note 106, at
1128-29 (rebutting a proposition that "the international legal status of human rights" is
exaggerated and presenting argument "that an international law of human rights actu-
ally exists").
110. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (observing
that torture is forbidden under customary international law).
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tomary international law now protects individuals from tor-
ture111 and racial discrimination1 2 as well as from arbitrary de-
tention," 3 arbitrary deprivation,1 4 and international abduc-
tion.115
A human rights provision or practice from any source be-
comes customary international law when it meets two require-
ments: (1) general acceptance and observance by most states, 16
and (2) opinio juris in the states directly confronting the issue
addressed by the practice.1 1 7 The prohibition on torture, for ex-
ample, satisfies the first principle if it is observed as a common
state practice, has been implemented as part of national legisla-
tion, or is incorporated in international agreements. 18 A provi-
sion constitutes an upiniojuris if it represents ajudicial or govern-
mental recognition that the practice is required by law. 1
International and national courts have also addressed
human rights issues.1 20 In Velasquez Rodriguez Case,121 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 22 ruled in favor of the plain-
111. Id.
112. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168 (Austl. 1982).
113. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on
other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAw 193 (1989).
115. Nguyen DaYen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975); U.S.
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. STENBERG, supra note 4, at 272-73.
117. Id. at 278. A practice is considered "opiniojuris sive necessitatis" when acts are
"carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it .... The States concerned must
... feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation." North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
118. STENBERG, supra note 4, at 272.
119. Id. at 278 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 44.); see supra
note 117 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf Cases).
120. See, e.g., Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand orJusticia-
ble Guarantees?: Social Rights in a South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 55 n.169
(1992) (discussing judicial attention to human rights issues); Soering v. United King-
dom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (exemplifying international court concern for
humau rights).
121. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgement ofJuly 29, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91, OAS/
ser.C No.4 (1988).
122. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMER-
ICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(the "Inter-American Court") is an organ of the Organization of American States, (the
"OAS") an association of South, Central, and North American States. Id. at 1. The
Inter-American Court was created in 1978 by the American Convention on Human
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tiff in a wrongful death action, finding that the Honduran gov-
ernment failed to meet the duty to safeguard individuals from
human rights violations. 123 The court in Velasquez also linked a
country's obligation to respect human rights with the idea of
placing limits on the exercise of state power. 124 The court noted
that a country's act or omission that infringes on an individual's
rights is imputable to the state even where the conduct is not
officially sanctioned by the government.121
In Soering v. United Kingdom,126 the European Court of
Human Rights' 2 7 addressed the issue of human rights in the con-
text of an extradition order.12  In Soering, the court prevented
the extradition of the plaintiff because the court felt that an im-
mediate consequence of his extradition would have been to ex-
pose him to ill-treatment. 29 The United Kingdom sought to ex-
tradite the plaintiff to the United States, where he would have
been tried for murder and subject to the death penalty if found
guilty.'30 This punishment is not recognized in Europe."'
In Kindler v. Canada (Minister ofJustice), the Supreme Court
of Canada also addressed a case involving identical facts. 132
However, in contrast to Soering, the court in Kindler allowed the
plaintiff to be extradited despite the likelihood that he would be
subject to the death penalty.' 33 The court noted that in Canada
there is no consensus that capital punishment is unacceptable
Rights. Id. The seven judges must all be qualified to sit on the highest court of their
home country and are elected to six year terms by an absolute majority of the OAS
General Assembly. Id. The United States has signed but not ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights. MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 459 (1982).
123. Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 155.
124. Id. at 151-52.
125. Id. at 153.
126. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
127. J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (1988). The European Court of Human Rights ("the
Court") was created in 1959 by the European Convention on Human Rights which was
implemented nine years earlier. Id. It is an organ of the Council of Europe. Id. at 3.
The number of judges is equal to the number of member states which is currently
twenty-one. Id. at 6. Nominees to the Court are elected by the Council of Europe's
Consultative Assembly and must be qualified to hold high judicial office. Id.
128. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
129. Id. at 44-45.
130. Id. at 12-14.
131. Id. at 40.
132. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2 S.C.R. 779, 840-42 (Can. 1991).
133. Id. at 840.
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and that capital punishment as practiced in the United States
does not offend the Canadian conscience."3 4 In addition, the
court held that extradition, in this case, would not violate the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 35 However, the
court did observe that some cases of extradition, which expose
fugitives to "morally abhorrent" or "unacceptable" treatment,
would rise to the level of a human rights violation.1 36
The Supreme Constitutional Court of Germany, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, has also recognized that the custom-
ary international law of human rights may forbid extradition in
some situations.13 7 In a 1987 case, the court, while granting an
extradition request from Turkey where the individual sought
had already completed a prison sentence in Greece for the same
offense, determined that neither customary international law
nor treaty law prohibited a second incarceration of a defendant
based on the same offense. 1 8 The court required, however, that
the prosecution be done in a different state. 39
2. Human Rights Conditions in Haiti
In Haiti, human rights violations were common under the
dictatorships of Francois Duvalier, who ruled Haiti from 1957 to
1971,140 his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, who ruled until 1986,141
134. Id. at 851-52.
135. Id. at 840. The court explained in several ways the test it used:
The test for whether an extradition law or action offends § 7 of the Char-
ter on account of the penalty which may be imposed in the requesting state, is
whether the imposition of the penalty by the foreign state "sufficiently shocks"
the Canadian conscience. The fugitive must establish that he or she faces "a
situation which is simply unacceptable"... At the end of the day, the question
is whether the provision or action in question offends the Canadian sense of
what is fair, right and just, bearing in mind the nature of the offence and the
penalty, the foreign justice system and considerations of comity and security,
and according due latitude to the Minister to balance the conflicting consider-
ations."
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 851.
137. See Judgement of Mar. 31, 1987, BVerfG, 1987 Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift [NJW] 2155 (F.D.R.) (examining customary international law of human rights in
context of challenged extradition proceeding); see also MERON, supra note 114, at 133-
34 (discussing Judgement of Mar. 31, 1987).
138. MERON, supra note 114, at 133-34.
139. Id.
140. Bella Stumbo, Sharing Wealth, Power; Haiti: How the 2 Elites Take Turns, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Elites]; Bella Stumbo, Powerful, Chic First Lady
Generous to Poor, Herself," Haiti's 'Baby Doc' Governs in Isolation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1985,
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and the numerous military-backed governments that followed
them. 4 ' Many of the human rights violations committed by
these regimes were carried out by the Tontons Macoutes, a
loosely organized militia of over 15,000 men founded by Fran-
cois Duvalier in 1958.143 During the course of Francois
Duvalier's fifteen year "political revolution," over 100,000 Hai-
tian's were exiled and nearly 30,000 more killed. 141 While many
in Haiti and the United States considered Jean-Claude Duvalier
to be milder than his father, random murders and beatings were
still common.145 Political opponents and journalists were often
targets because they criticized Duvalier.141 They were beaten, ex-
iled, or jailed for expressing their views. 1 47
In 1991, Haiti chose its first democratically elected presi-
dent in 187 years of independence, Father Jean-Bertrand Aris-
tide. 4 8 Despite his popular support, the Haitian military ousted
President Aristide during his first year.149 Since the coup, large
numbers of Haitians, including those believed to have supported
Father Aristide, have been killed, 5 ° tortured, arrested without
warrant, or have witnessed the destruction of their belongings.15 '
at I [hereinafter First Lady]. Francois Duvalier was more commonly known as "Papa
Doc" Duvalier. First Lady, supra, at 1.
141. First Lady, supra note 141, at 1. Jean-Claude Duvalier, like his father, was also
commonly known by his nickname, "Baby Doc." Id.
142. Id.; Danner, supra note 27, at 39; Karen DeYoung, Baby Doc's Haiti is Less
Bloody But Still Bowed; Face of Haiti Remains the Same, WASH. POsT, Sept. 10, 1978, at A23;
Elites, supra note 141, at 1; Bella Stumbo, From Horror to Hope, L.A. TIMES MAG., Apr. 21,
1991, at 8 [hereinafter Hope]; Treaster, supra note 95, at Al.
143. Area: 10, 714 Square Miles, Capitol: Port-au-Prince, President: Ertha Pascal-Trouillot,
UPI, Dec. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file [hereinafter Area]; Hope,
supra note 143 at 1.
144. Danner, supra note 27, at 39.
145. Treaster, supra note 95, at Al; Area, supra note 144; First Lady, supra note 141,
at 1.
146. Treaster, supra note 95, at Al.
147. Id.
148. See Haiti's Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1991, at Al; Howard W. French, Haiti's First President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1991 at
A2; Hilary Mackenzie, A Cycle of Despair, MAcLEAN's, Oct. 21, 1991, at 76.
149. Mackenzie, supra note 148, at 76.
150. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL
155853, at *1, (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992), aff'd in part, vacated in part, Haitian Centers
Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom, Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -_, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993); see also 138 CONG. REC.
S13,095-96 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (discussing condi-
tions in Haiti) [hereinafter DeConcini Statement].
151. McNaiy, 1992 WL 155853, at *1.
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Thousands more have been forced to go into hiding. 5 2 People
continue to disappear without a trace, free speech has been re-
stricted, assassinations are common, and people are jailed for
having pro-Aristide materials, such as photographs of President
Aristide, in their home. 153  Fearing for their safety, numerous
Haitians have fled Haiti for the United States throughout these
years.1 5
4
While many Haitians have fled for personal safety, others
have fled the impoverished conditions in Haiti. 5 ' Haiti is con-
sidered the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere. 56 The
political structure of the past three decades and the more recent
turmoil have exacerbated the poor conditions long present in
Haiti. 57 Many of the Haitians returned under the interdiction
program were sent back to Haiti on the grounds that they were
fleeing for economic reasons and not due to persecution. 58
Despite claims and reports of human rights abuses in Haiti,
the U.S. Bureau for Refugee Programs in the State Department
reported to Congress that the repatriated Haitians, those who
had fled Haiti and were subsequently returned by the Coast
Guard, have not been ill-treated and that there is no evidence of
152. Id.; see William Shawcross, Mass Migration and the Global Village, REFUGEES,Jan.
1992, at 26 ("In the vast majority of cases, refugees would prefer to go home. They have
been forced out."); Garry Pierre-Pierre, Anxious Haitians Start Building Boats Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993, at Al, A10. Luc Selmot, a Haitian resident of Petit-Goave in Haiti,
described his situation in October 1993 saying that "[w]hen I leave, nobody is going to
send me back here.... The United States knows what's going on here, so when I leave
they can't send me back. They might as well kill me on the spot. That's what the
military will do to us." Id.
153. DeConcini Statement, supra note 151, at S13,095 (quoting joint report by
Americas Watch, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Physicians for
Human Rights, Dec. 31, 1991).
154. See Pierre-Pierre, supra note 153 (quoting a Haitian who expects to flee Haiti
because he fears for his life).
155. Bohning, supra note 96, at All.
156. Area, supra note 144. While consumer prices are similar to prices in the
United States, the per capita income is only U.S.$380 per year with 80% of Haitians
earning less than U.S.$150 per year. Area, supra note 144, at 2; Elites, supra note 141, at
-; First Lady, supra note 141, at 1. Another group comprising 0.5% of Haitians are
believed to earn approximately one billion dollars per year which amounts to nearly
50% of the nation's annual budget. Danner, supra note 27, at 39. Infant mortality is
approximately 25% and for adults and children, malnutrition is the leading cause of
death. First Lady, supra note 141, at 1.
157. Elites, supra note 141.
158. Press Release, supra note 32.
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reprisals.' 59 Human rights groups, however, say that there is no
way to monitor how the returnees are treated once they return
to their villages where there is little international supervision.16 °
One group of repatriated migrants, who ultimately escaped Ha-
iti, reported that members of their group were attacked by
soldiers upon the groups' repatriation. 6 ' According to foreign
observers in Haiti, returnees are often put through re-admission
formalities in public, in front of the police and military, thus in-
creasing the risk of subsequent attack.'62 Additionally, in Octo-
ber 1993, the Haitian government sought to indict four recent
returnees for organizing the departure of a group of migrants.16 3
E. The Interdiction Program
In 1981, while Jean-Claude Duvalier was still in power, Presi-
dent Reagan responded to the great number of Haitians fleeing
human rights violations and economic depression in Haiti by im-
plementing an interdiction program.'64 The Haitian interdic-
tion program began when the United States and the Haitian gov-
ernments exchanged letters on September 23, 1981 .165 The let-
159. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAu OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS, WORLD
REFUGEE REPORT 10 (1992).
160. Michael Tarr, No One Knows What Happens To Refugees, Haiti Rights Groups Say,
Reuter Newswire, Feb. 12, 1992, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS file.
161. Id.
162. Linda Diebel, Canadian Ships to Return Haitian Refugees, Oct. 27, 1993, To-
RONTO STAR, at A21.
163. Howard W. French, Boat People Face Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at
A5.
164. Interdiction Letters, supra note 13, 33 U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241.
165. Id. The text of the letter from the American Ambassador to the Haitian Sec-
retary of State for Foreign Affairs reads:
Excellency:
I have the honor to refer to the mutual concern of the Governments of
the United States and of the Republic of Haiti to stop the clandestine migra-
tion of numerous residents of Haiti to the United States and to the mutual
desire of our two countries to cooperate to stop such illegal migration.
The United States Government confirms... the establishment of a coop-
erative program of interdiction and selective return to Haiti of certain Haitian
migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons coming from Ha-
iti.
Having regard to the need for international cooperation regarding law
enforcement measures taken with respect to vessels on the high seas and the
international obligations mandated in the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees .... the United States Government confirms... the following points
of agreement:
Upon boarding a Haitian flag vessel ... the authorities of the United
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ters authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept any Haitian
vessels 66 and detain those individuals suspected of attempting to
States Government may address inquiries, examine documents and.., estab-
lish the ... destination of the vessel ... When these measures suggest that an
offense against United States immigration laws or... Haitian laws has been or
is being committed, the Government of the Republic of Haiti consents to the
detention on the high seas ... of the vessels and persons found on board.
The Government of Haiti agrees to permit ... the return of detained
vessels and persons to a Haitian port...
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it has
received from the Government of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians returned
to their country and who are not traffickers will not be subject to prosecution
for illegal departure.
It is understood that under these arrangements the United States Govern-
ment does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the
United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status.
In furtherance of this cooperative undertaking the United States Govern-
ment formally requests the Government of the Republic of Haiti's consent to
the boarding by the authorities of the United States Government of private
Haitian flag vessels tin any case] in which such authorities have reason to be-
lieve that the vessels may be involved in the irregular carriage of passengers
outbound from Haiti.
... Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera-
tion.
Ernest H. Preeg
Interdiction Letters, supra note 13, 33 U.S.T. at 3559-61, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241, at 1-3.
The Haitian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Edouard Francisque, replied ac-
knowledging the text of American Ambassador's letter and added:
I have the honor of informing you that the Haitian Government gives its
agreement to the propositions reproduced herein. Consequently, your letter
and the present response constitute an agreement by exchange of letters be-
tween the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Haiti.
Id., 33 U.S.T. at 3562-65, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241, at 4-7 (translation by author). The agree-
ment will remain in force until six months after either government announces its intent
to terminate it. Id., 33 U.S.T. at 3560-61, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241 at 2-3.
166. Interdiction Letters, supra note 13, 33 U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241; see
supra note 166 (quoting Interdiction Letters). On April 8, 1994, exiled Haitian Presi-
dent Aristide notified U.S. President Bill Clinton that President Aristide would end the
interdiction agreement in October, 1994. Steven Greenhouse, Aristide to End Accord
That Allows U.S. to Seize Refugee Boats, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at A6. U.S. officials said
they would continue to stop Haitian boats after the agreement ends. Id.
Technically, international law forbids a state from intercepting ships flying the flag
of another state without the flag state's consent. See U.S. v. Green, 671 F.2d 46 (denying
claim that foreign vessel was illegally boarded), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982). That
is why the United States sought Haiti's permission before beginning the interdiction
program. See Interdiction Letters, supra note 13 (granting permission to interdict).
However, in practice, this requirement rarely prevents interceptions. Green, 671 F.2d at
50. Fleeing refugees may not have any markings on their boat, which would make it a
ship without nationality and hence unprotected. Id. Yet, even when a vessel flies its
flag, intercepting ships can obtain permission from the flag state by radio, as the United
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illegally immigrate to the U.S. 1 67 Further, the United States was
authorized to subsequently return- to Haiti those illegal immi-
grants who did not qualify for refugee status, with the proviso
that the Haitian government would not prosecute them for ille-
gal departure.' 68
On September 29, 1981, President Reagan issued a procla-
mation calling the vast numbers of illegal aliens arriving by sea a
detriment to American interests.169 President Reagan then is-
sued Executive Order No. 12,324 directing the Coast Guard to
exercise the power granted in the U.S. agreement with Haiti.171
A significant caveat, however, was that those Haitians who fell
within the definition of a "refugee" were not to be returned with-
out their consent.' 7 ' The definition of a refugee under the 1951
Convention 172 does not include those who flee for economic rea-
sons.17 3 Therefore, the interdiction program was intended to re-
turn those fleeing Haiti solely on the basis of poor economic
conditions.1
7
,
On the basis of interviews conducted on board the inter-
dicted vessels and Coast Guard cutters, Immigration and Natu-
States Coast Guard often does when searching for illegal drugs. Id. ("The practice of
obtaining prior consent of the foreign flag state is apparently a fairly common one[.]").
167. Interdiction Letters, supra note 13, 33 U.S.T. at 3560, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241, at 2-
3.
168. Id.
169. Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50 (1982) [hereinafter Proclamation] ("ille-
gal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens into the southeastern
United States").
170. Exec. Order No. 12,324, supra note 11, 3 C.F.R. at 181.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 1 (defining "refugee").
173. Id. The American administration and others have dismissed the Haitian im-
migrants as mere economic refugees. Diederich, supra note 14, at 43. However, immi-
grants such as Selmot and others often have mixed motives in leaving Haiti. As one
U.N. commentator observed:
[T] here is a tendency amongst Western governments to denounce all refu-
gees as mere economic migrants, and therefore an underclass of people with
absolutely no privileges. This is intolerable for two reasons. It encourages
governments to deny the human rights of such people. And it encourages us
to believe that there is a hard and fast distinction between refugees and mere
economic migrants. There is not always. Consider, for example, Jewish
merchants who fled from Central Europe in the early and mid-30's when their
businesses were clearly threatened but often before their lives were endan-
gered.
Shawcross, supra note 153, at 28.
174. Diederich, supra note 14.
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ralization Service ("INS") field officers "screened-in" those mak-
ing a credible showing of political refugee status.' 75  Those
"screened-out" as leaving for reasons other than persecution
were immediately returned to Haiti.1 76 Over 25,000 immigrants
were returned to Haiti between the start of the program and
September 1991.177
Ten years and a week after the exchange of letters, which
enabled the, interdiction program to begin on September 30,
1991, the Haitian military seized power, overthrowing President
Aristide.178 In response, the United States imposed a strict em-
bargo on Haiti. 79 As a result of the increased violence and dete-
riorating economy, emigration increased to a level even higher
than in 1981.180 Between October 1991 and June 1992, the
Coast Guard stopped nearly 37,000 immigrants.1 8 1 The volume
of immigrants forced the screening process to be moved from
on board the Coast Guard vessels to Guantanamo Naval Base, in
Cuba, where longer interviews were possible due to better condi-
tions. 182
Mr. Gene McNary, appointed by President Bush in October,
1992, modified the screening process by adding specially trained
asylum corp officers, who were more experienced in conducting
175. Brief for Petitioner at 2, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -'
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file. See
supra notes 75, 77 (quoting § 243 of INA before and after amendment).
176. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 2.
177. Id.; see Suro, supra note 7, at A8 (presenting overview of U.S. interdiction
program).
178. See Haiti's Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1991, at AI; Howard W. French, Haiti's First President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1991, at
A2.
179. John M. Goshko, Bush Strengthens Curb on Haiti Trade Embargo, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 1991, at A6; Oswald Johnston, U.S. Puts Squeeze on Haiti with Embargo, Sanctions,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at A4.
180. Kenneth Freed, Haiti Embargo Brings Misery to All But Rich, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1991, at Al; Lee Hockstader, U.S. Memo on Haiti Embargo Says Widespread Hunger Looms,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1991, at A17; Lee Hockstader, Haitians Struggling Under Trade Em-
bargo as Talks Begin, Hardships Worsen for Poor, WASH. PosT, Nov. 23, 1991, at A21; WORLD
REFUGEE REPORT, supra note 160, at 10.
181. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 2.
182. Michael S. Teitelbaum, Political Tides, Haitian Waves; An Exodus was Risky, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at A19. Susan Beck, Casting Away: How the INS Tried to Save the
Haitians and How Bush Administration Hard Line Policy Prevailed, AM. LAw., Oct 1992, at
51. As one asylum officer observed, the ships were "no place to do an interview. The
sun is a killer, and the wind makes it impossible to write. Papers are curling up under
twenty to thirty-knot winds." Id.
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asylum interviews and were given regular updates on the condi-
tions in Haiti."8 3 Gregg Beyer, a former official with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the director of
the asylum corp, also instituted a more lenient standard for the
first phase of the screening process. 8 4 Under the new standard,
Haitians only needed to demonstrate a "credible fear" of perse-
cution rather than a "well-founded fear" as normally required to
receive asylum. 8 As a result, the number of immigrants quali-
fied to enter the United States and further pursue their asylum
claims jumped from one percent 8 6 to nearly thirty percent. 18 7
On May 22, 1992, the U.S. Navy declared that "there is no
room at the inn," 8 and announced that the temporary facilities
at Guantanamo had reached their maximum capacity. 8 9 The
following day, President Bush issued Executive Order No.
12,807. This order declared that Article 33 of the 1951 Conven-
tion did not extend to individuals located beyond J.S. terri-
tory.' 90 Executive Order No. 12,807, therefore, directed the
Coast Guard to stop Haitian vessels and return passengers lack-
ing sufficient immigration documents, regardless of their refu-
gee claims.191 According to the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, the United States became the first country
to ever implement such a policy. 92
An exception to President Bush's order allowed the Attor-
183. Beck, supra note 182, at 55-56.
184. Id.; see supra note 1 (presenting definition of refugee). Beyer's standard was
unofficial and is not a part of INS regulations. Beck, supra note 182, at 55.
185. Beck, supra note 182, at 55.
186. Id. at 55-56; Suzanne Gluck, Note, Intercepting Refugees at Sea: An Analysis of the
United States' Legal and Moral Obligations, 61 FoRnDHAm L. REv. 865, 871 n.37 (1993).
187. Beck, supra note 182 at 55-56; see DAVID MARTIN, THE NEw AsyLUM SEEKERS, 6
(1986). At one point, in January 1990, the screen-in rate briefly reached 85%. Beck,
supra note 182, at 52. In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, the Haitian Refugee Center,
Inc., unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the repatriation of screened out migrants who
were waiting at Guantanamo on the grounds that the screening procedure was still
inadequate. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir., 1992).
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that aliens interdicted on the high seas had no right to
judicial review of an INS decision rejecting their applications. Id.
188. Bill Frelick, Haiti: No Room at the Inn, REFUGEES, July 1992, at 34, 37.
189. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2555 (1993).
190. Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 14, 3 C.R.F. at 303.
191. Id.
192. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., -
U.S. -. , 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344), at 3, available in LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is the
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ney General, with discretion,, to decide that a person would not
be returned without that person's consent.'93 The Attorney
General, however, never exercised this power.19 4  President
Bush's executive order did not refer to the Haitian immigrants
specifically, but only to aliens coming by sea.1 95 However, a press
release dated the day after the executive order clearly expressed
President Bush's intent to return to Haiti all Haitians picked up
at sea. 196
Executive Order 12,807 was enforced for two years. On May
7, 1994, however, President Clinton rejected it, announcing a
new plan to grant all interdicted Haitians asylum interviews.' 97
Although asylum interviews had been offered at U.S. facilities in
Haiti since 1992, President Clinton's administration observed
that increased violence and repression in Haiti had rendered
such methods inadequate. 198 While maintaining that most of
the Haitian migrants were fleeing for economic and not political
reasons, and would therefore be returned to Haiti, the U.S. gov-
ernment agreed that it was necessary to conduct comprehensive
interviews at sites in other nations and on board U.S. ships in
order to ensure that refugees were protected. 99
II. SALE v. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. ("Haitian Centers"), the re-
spondent, filed suit against the petitioner, the U.S. Government,
United Nations' organization responsible for assisting refugees worldwide and for de-
veloping solutions for refugee problems in general. Id. at 11.
193. Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 14, 3 C.F.R. at 303. According to Execu-
tive Order 12,807: "the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide
that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his consent." Exec. Order
No. 12,807, supra note 14, 3 C.F.R. at 303.
194. Thomas L. Friedman, Haitians Returned Under New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1992, at Al.
195. Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 14, 3 C.F.R. at 303.
196. White House Statement on Haitian Migrants, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
924 (May 24, 1992). The press release also discouraged Haitians from embarking for
the U.S., stating that it would be safer to remain in Haiti. Id. ("Under current circum-
stances, the safety of Haitians is best assured by remaining in their country.").
197. Ifill, supra note 32, at Al.
198. Ifill, supra note 32, at Al, A14; Position Paper, supra note 32, at 3.
199. Position Paper, supra note 32, at 3; Ifill, supra note 32, at Al, A14; Steven
Greenhouse, U.S. Is Urged to Allow In More Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A9; see
Haitians Interviewed on Ship, TIME, June 27, 1994, at 24 (noting completion of first inter-
views aboard U.S. ship in Jamaican waters).
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on March 18, 1992.200 On appeal, Haitian Centers urged the
U.S. Supreme Court to hold that the 1980 amendments to the
INA applied to aliens on the high seas in accordance with the
1951 Convention. 21  The government, however, argued that
neither was intended to apply beyond U.S. territory.20 2 Finding
for the petitioner, the Court utilized legislative and negotiating
histories, along with dictionary translations of the 1951 Conven-
tion's terms, to hold that neither the INA nor the 1951 Conven-
tion was intended to apply extraterritorially. 2 3
A. Procedural History
Respondents, Haitian Centers, first filed their suit in New
York on March 18, 1992, on behalf of a class of Haitians inter-
dicted and detained at Guantanomo Naval Base in Cuba.2 4 The
original suit, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNay, was filed
before President Bush's Executive Order No. 12,807 was is-
sued.20 5
While this initial case was being appealed, the President is-
sued Executive Order No. 12,807, which ordered the Coast
Guard to return the interdicted migrants without identifying ref-
ugees.20 6 Haitian Centers subsequently requested a temporary
order to restrain the order's implementation, arguing that the
200. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992), aff'd in part, vacated in part, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v.
McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom, Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
201. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 7-8.
202. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 16, 21.
203. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993)
204. McNaiy, 1992 WL 155853, at *1-3; Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2556.
205. McNary, 1992 WL 155853, at *1. This suit alleged that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Secretary of State, the Coast Guard and the Commander of
Guantanamo Naval Base were improperly denying the detained Haitians access to legal
counsel for interviews during which INS officers screened for those having a "well
founded fear" of persecution in Haiti. Id. The "well founded fear" standard was identi-
cal to that used for hearings on the mainland where migrants are entitled to counsel.
Id. at *5. The organizations representing the Haitians further alleged that such con-
duct violated their First Amendment right to free speech and freedom of association.
Id. The District Court agreed and enjoined the defendants from denying access to
counsel and from repatriating Haitians who had not been allowed to speak with an
attorney. Id. at *9-10. The injunction was subsequently stayed by the Supreme Court in
April 1992. McNaiy, 113 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 1714 (1992)).
206. McNay, 112 S. Ct. at 2556.
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doctrine of non-refoulement prohibited the return of all Hai-
tians to Haiti.20 7 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, however, denied the request.2 8 The district court
claimed that while the 1967 Protocol's non-refoulement provi-
sion may in fact prohibit the action called for in President Bush's
order, the 1967 Protocol was not self-executing and section
243(h) of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, did
not provide relief for those interdicted on the high seas.20 9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
finding that the plain language of the 1951 Convention and of
section 243(h) indicated that both applied to international wa-
ters.210 This holding conflicted with an Eleventh Circuit ruling
on the same issue in which the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Hai-
tians interdicted on the high seas were not protected under the
INA.2 1 Observing the split in the circuits and the importance of
the issue,21 2 the Supreme Court granted the government's writ
for certiorari and issued its final decision in June, 1993, eleven
months before President Clinton reversed President Bush's no-
interview policy.21 3
207. McNaty, 1992 WL 155853, at *11.
208. Id. at *12. In District Court Judge Johnson's decision in McNary he empha-
sized that:
It is unconscionable that the Unites States should accede to the Protocol
and later claim that it is not bound by it .... As it stands now, Article 33 is a
cruel hoax and not worth the paper it is printed on unless Congress enacts
legislation implementing its provisions or a higher court reconsiders Bertrand
[v. Sava]. Until that time, however, this court feels constrained by the ration-
ale of Bertrand and cannot grant the Plaintiffs relief on this claim.
Id. (citing Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that neither 1951
Convention nor 1967 Protocol are self-executing) (footnote omitted).
209. McNaiy, 1992 WL 155853, at *12.
210. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. - 113 S.Ct 2549, 2558 (1993);
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1360-62 (2d Cir., 1992), rev'd
sub nom., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). The
Second Circuit held that:
[t]he plain language of Article 33.1 of the [1951] Convention leads us to con-
clude that,just as with § 243(h) (1), the word "return" means "return", without
regard to where the refugee is to be returned from, and, just as with
§ 243(h) (1), what is important under Article 33.1 is where the refugee is to be
returned to.
Id. at 1362.
211. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. v. Baker).
212. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2558.
213. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct 52 (1992); Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, - U.S. - (1993); 113 S. Ct. 2549; Ifill, supra note 32, at Al.
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B. The Parties' Positions
Haitian Centers Council, urging affirmation of the Second
Circuit's holding, argued that the 1951 Convention, as applied
by the 1967 Protocol, applies extraterritorially, and thus pro-
tected the Haitians.2 14 They further argued that, under the INA
as modified by the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States can-
not deport or return Haitian refugees.2" 5 The government, in
contrast, argued that the Refugee Act did not make the INA ap-
ply to refugees beyond U.S. territory.21 6 The government also
argued that the terms of the 1951 Convention preclude it from
applying extraterritorially.
21 7
1. Haitian Centers Council's Argument for Affirming the
Second Circuit's Decision
Haitian Centers, the respondent, argued that the Second
Circuit's decision should be affirmed.218 They reasoned that
President Bush's order to return the migrants without screening
for refugees violated Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, the 1967
Protocol, and section 243(h) (1) of the INA.219 Describing Arti-
cle 33 of the 1951 Convention as "self-executing," the respon-
dents argued that the text, structure, purpose, legislative history,
negotiating history, and the Executive Branch's interpretation of
the INA and the 1951 Convention protects all refugees regard-
less of where they are found.22 °
To demonstrate that the INA provides relief for the Hai-
tians, the respondent relied upon the INA amendments made by
the Refugee Act of 1980.221 These amendments added the word
"return" and removed the words "within the United States" from
section 243(h) (1).222 Respondents argued that these changes
removed the geographical limitation on section 243(h) (1)'s ap-
plication.223 They further argued that the re-worded section
214. Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 7.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 18.
217. Id. at 21-23.
218. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 14.
219. Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 7-8.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 9; see supra notes 75, 77 and accompanying text (describing amend-
ments to Immigration and Naturalization Act).
223. Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 7.
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243(h) made its application mandatory. 224 The non-refoule-
ment protection, therefore, should have extended to Haitians
beyond U.S. territory.225
2. Government's Argument for Overturning the Second
Circuit's Decision
The Executive branch contended that neither the INA nor
the 1951 Convention applied beyond U.S. territorial waters.22 6
In support of their argument, the government relied upon the
traditional presumption against applying legislation extraterrito-
rially where Congress has not explicitly provided for such appli-
cation. 227  Additionally, the government argued that section
243(h) (1) did not apply to the interdicted Haitians for two other
reasons. First, section 243(h) (1) is located in Part V of the INA,
which addresses expelling aliens from U.S. territory.228 Accord-
ing to the government, this section is directed at the Attorney
General, who is specifically responsible for expelling aliens.229
The government concluded that section 243(h) (1)'s non-
refoulement policy, therefore, did not apply to the President.23
0
Second, the interdiction program was carried out by the Coast
Guard beyond U.S. territorial waters. 231 According to the gov-
ernment, section 243(h) (1) could not have limited the interdic-
tion program because the Attorney General's immigration duties
under section 243(h) (1) only apply within U.S. territory.232
Further, the government emphasized that the Refugee Act
of 1980 was intended merely to reverse an earlier Supreme
Court ruling in Leng May Ma v. Barber.233 In Leng May Ma, the
Court addressed whether the phrase "within the United States,"
as used in the unamended section 243(h) (1), referred to an ex-
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 16, 2.1.
227. Id. at 16 (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., - U.S., 111 S. Ct.
1227, 1230 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) and
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
228. Id. at 17-18.
229. See supra note 76 (explaining Attorney General's powers).
230. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 7.
231. Id. at 17-18; see supra notes 165-98 and accompanying text (describing in-
terdiction program and agreement with Haiti allowing it).
232. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 17-18.
233. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 18 (citing Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185 (1958)).
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cludable alien as well as expellable aliens.2"4 The Court con-
cluded that it did not, and therefore, only expellable aliens,
those "within the United States," were entitled to the protection
available in section 243.235 Therefore, the government argued
that the Refugee Act did not affect the geographical area to
which the INA applied and that the amendment removing the
phrase could not have altered the INA's exclusively territorial
application. 236 According to the government, because the INA's
legislative history never referred to extraterritorial application,
Congress did not remove "within the United States" with the in-
tent of extending the INA's reach.237
Finally, arguing that the 1951 Convention also applied only
to aliens physically within U.S. territory, the government relied
on the plain meaning of the 1951 Convention's text.238 The gov-
ernment argued that the word "expel" in Article 33(1) referred
to aliens in the territory of a contracting state, 23 9 and that "ex-
pel" is one translation of "refouler." The government concluded
that the phrase "return ('refouler')" merely refers to its territo-
rial use.24°
C. The Court's Decision to Overturn the Second Circuit
The Supreme Court, in Sale, held that neither section
243(h) (1) of the INA nor Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention
applied to refugees located in international waters, and there-
fore, President Bush's Executive Order 12,807 did not violate
the United States' obligations under the 1967 Protocol. 241 The
majority reasoned that section 243(h)(1) of the INA reflected
the terms of the 1951 Convention, and that the drafters of the
1951 Convention intended to limit its application to within state
territory.242 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, in his dissent, however,
argued that the majority ignored the plain meaning of the 1951
234. Id.
235. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (1993).
236. Id.; see supra notes 70-93 and accompanying text (explaining INA and Refu-
gee Act amendments).
237. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at 8.
238. Id. at 7, 21-23.
239. Id. at 7, 23 ("The prohibition against 'expelling' plainly has in mind a refugee
who is within the territory of the Contracting State.").
240. Id.
241. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S.- , 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2551 (1993).
242. Id.
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Convention's text, and thus, failed to correctly interpret Article
33(1).243
1. The Majority Ruling
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the eight member ma-
jority, held that neither the INA nor the 1951 Convention pro-
tected aliens on the high seas.244 First, the Court addressed the
INA, noting that both President Reagan's Executive Order No.
12,324 and President Bush's Executive Order No. 12,807 were
based upon sections 1103(a) and 1182(f) of the INA.245 These
sections confer powers and obligations specifically upon the U.S.
President.246 The Court also observed that the Attorney Gen-
eral's role, however, is detailed in a separate section.247 The
Court noted that Part V of the INA addresses the Attorney Gen-
eral's role and only refers to the Attorney General's "normal"
immigration duties.248 As the Court recognized, "normal" immi-
gration duties are conducted within the United States, not on
the high seas. 249 The Court concluded, therefore, that while sec-
tion 243(h) (1), which is within Part V, in fact restricts the Attor-
ney General's actions within the United States, the section does
not restrict the President's extraterritorial actions.250
Second, the Court examined Article 33 of the 1951 Conven-
243. Id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2549.
245. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2559 (1993).
246. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a) and 1182(f)).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2559-60. "The reference to the Attorney General in the statutory text
... suggests that it applies only to the Attorney General's normal responsibilities under
the INA. The most relevant of those responsibilities for our purposes is her conduct of
the deportation and exclusion hearings." Id. See supra note 76 (indicating that Attor-
ney General is responsible for enforcing laws relating to immigration and naturalization
of aliens).
249. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2559-60 (1993).
250. Id. The Court also found that the use of both "deport" and "return" in sec-
tion 243(h) "implies an exclusively territorial application ... [and] reflects the tradi-
tional division between" deportation and exclusion proceedings. Id. at 2560. The origi-
nal INA only referred to deportation of aliens 'within the United States". Id. at 2560-
61. In Leng May Ma v. Barber, the Court held that the original statute did not apply to
an alien "seeking 'admission' and trying to avoid 'exclusion'" because she was not
"within the United States" in terms of admission. Id. at 2561. As a result, the Court
found that the 1980 amendments, removing "within the United States" and adding "re-
turn" were to remedy the Barber holding and not to eliminate the statute's territorial
restriction. Id.
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tion.251 The Court found that the Refugee Act's legislative his-
tory proved Congress' intent to conform U.S. immigration law to
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention.252 In evaluating the 1951
Convention the Court recognized that it could have created an
extraterritorial obligation that the INA does not codify.253 The
Court, however, found that the terms of Article 33(1) of the
1951 Convention held the same meaning as section 243 (h) (1) of
the INA and, consequently, only applied to refugees physically in
the territory of a signatory state.25 4 The Court examined the
plain meaning of "return" in Article 33(1) .255 Relying on a
number of French-English dictionary translations, the court de-
termined that the plain meaning was not appropriate for the
1951 Convention. 256  Noting that "return" is explained by
"refouler," the Court instead determined that "return
('refouler')" meant "a .defensive act of resistance or exclusion at
a border," and thus, did not apply to refugees in international
257 5waters.  The Court also examined the text of Article 33(2).258
251. Id. at 2562 (1993).
252. See supra notes 70-93 and accompanying notes (describing Refugee Act and
INA).
253. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2562. The Court noted:
because the history of the 1980 Act does disclose a general intent to conform
our law to Article 33 of the Convention, it might be argued that the extraterri-
torial obligations imposed by Article 33 were so clear that Congress, in acced-
ing to the Protocol, and then in amending the statute to harmonize the two,
meant to give the latter a correspondingly extraterritorial effect. Or, just as
the statute might have imposed an extraterritorial obligation that the Conven-
tion does not ... the Convention might have established an extraterritorial
obligation which the statute does not; under the Supremacy Clause, that
broader treaty obligation might then provide the controlling rule of law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
254. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993).
In doing so, the Court held that the 1951 Convention's use of the words "expel" and
"return" was parallel to the INA's use of "deport" and "return". Consequently, they
found that both the 1951 Convention and the INA were referring to the differences
between exclusion and deportation. See supra note 80 (explaining difference between
exclusion and deportation).
255. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563.
256. Id. The Court noted that "refouler" is not among the many French transla-
tions of "return." Id. at 2563-64. Translations of "return" cited by the Court include
"revenir," "retourner," "rentrer," "repondre," "repliquez," "renvoyer," and numerous
others. Id. at 2564 n.37 (citing THE NEw CAssELL's FRENCH DICrIONARY 440 (1973),
LAROUSSE MODERNE FRENCH ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (1978)). The English translations
of "refouler" that the Court used are "repulse," "repel," "drive back," and "expel." Id. at
2564 n.38 (citing CASSELL at 627, LAROUSSE at 607). Neither dictionary listed "return"
as a translation of "refouler." Id.
257. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2564.
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Article 33 (2) provides an exception to Article 33 (1) under which
a signatory state may withhold protection from a dangerous refu-
gee who is within the signatory state's territory.259 The Court
held that because Article 33(2) only applies within state terri-
tory, Article 33(1) must also be restricted to state territory.2 60
In examining the history of the 1951 Convention, the Court
acknowledged that the records of the drafting committee were
ambiguous. 261 The Court, however, concluded that the ad hoc
committee, which wrote the 1951 Convention, only intended a
territorial application of the treaty.262 The Court relied on sev-
eral delegates' statements regarding the term "refoulement."
263
Specifically, according to the conference records, the Swiss dele-
gate expressed the opinion that "the word 'return' ("refoule-
ment") related to a refugee already within the territory, but not
yet resident there."264 The Court further relied on the Dutch
delegate, Baron van Boetzelaer's, personal impression that there
was a "general consensus" on such an interpretation.265 While
the Court observed that the negotiating history was not disposi-
tive, the Court found that it supported the majority's predilec-
tion toward a non-extraterritorial interpretation.266 Thus, the
258. Id. at 2563.
259. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (quoting Article 33 of 1951 Conven-
tion).
260. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. ,113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993).
261. Id. at 2567.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2566-67
(1993) (referring to Baron van Boetzelaer) (citing Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-fifth Meet-
ing, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.35, at 21-22 (July 25, 1951) [hereinafter Conference
Records]). The Baron subsequently requested that the record reflect the Conference's
agreement with the 'interpretations that the possibility of mass migrations across fron-
tiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by article 33.' Id. at 2566 (citing
Conference Records, supra at 21-22). According to the Conference transcript which
the Court quoted extensively: 'There being no objection, the PRESIDENT ruled that
the interpretation given by the Netherlands representative should be placed on record.'
Id. (citing Conference Records, supra at 21-22).
266. Id. at 2567. As the Court noted,
[t]he negotiating history, which suggests that the Convention's limited reach
resulted from a deliberate bargain, is not dispositive, but it solidly supports
our reluctance to interpret Article 33 to impose obligations on the contracting
parties that are broader than the text commands. We do not read that text to
apply to aliens interdicted on the high seas.
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Court reversed the Court of Appeal's decision and upheld Presi-
dent Bush's interdiction program.
2. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, criticized the majority's "tor-
tured reading" of the 1951 Convention's Article 33.267 Justice
Blackmun argued that the majority's failure to apply the Con-
vention's plain meaning resulted in a misinterpretation of the
use of the word "return" as used in section 243 of the INA.268
Justice Blackmun felt that the majority improperly relied on the
American division between deportation and exclusion. 69
Relying upon the Vienna Convention and previous
Supreme Court decisions, Justice Blackmun attacked the major-
ity's reliance on the 1951 Convention's history.2 7° According to
Justice Blackmun, not only were Baron van Boetzelaer's remarks
too weak to serve as a reliable indication 2 7 1 but the American
delegate had held a contrary view. 2 Justice Blackmun con-
267. Id. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun mocked the major-
ity's interpretation writing:
Today's majority... decides that the forced repatriation of the Haitian refu-
gees is perfectly legal, because the word "return" does not mean return be-
cause the opposite of "within the United States" is not outside the United
States and because the official charged with controlling immigration has no
role in enforcing an order to control immigration."
Id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
The ordinary meaning of 'return' is 'to bring, send, or put (a person or
thing) back to or in a former position' . . . . That describes precisely what
petitioners are doing to the Haitians. By dispensing with ordinary meaning at
the outset, and by taking instead as its starting point the assumption that 're-
turn,' as used in the Treaty, 'has a legal meaning narrower than its common
meaning,' the majority leads itself astray.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
269. Id.; see supra notes 245-67 and accompanying notes (describing majority's
analysis). In support of his interpretation, Justice Blackmun cites Le Monde, a french
newspaper, which in a current article used "refouler" to describe the American actions.
Id. (citing Le bourbier haitien, LE MONDE, May 31-June 1, 1992.)
270. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2570-71
(Blackmun,J., dissenting (1993) (citing Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457
U.S. 176 (1982), Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934), Vienna Convention, supra
note 60, art. 32 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at 692).
271. See supra note 266 (describing Baron's remarks).
272. Sale, 113 S. Ct. 2570-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun
noted:
[T] he United States delegate to the Committee... [stated] 'Whether it was
a question of closing the frontier to a refugee who asked admittance, or of
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cluded that the remarks on which the majority relied were not
considered official interpretations because they were not
"agreed to" or "adopted," as were the official amendments to the
1951 Convention. 3
The dissent also found section 243(h) to be "unambigu-
ous."274 Justice Blackmun believed that the INA's restriction on
the Attorney General's conduct also applied to the President
and the Coast Guard.2 75 According to justice Blackmun, the ma-
jority ignored a portion of the INA that confers upon the Attor-
ney General the authority and duty to protect U.S. borders.276
Because the interdiction program was implemented to protect
U.S. borders, this provision indicates that the interdiction policy
was within the Attorney General's jurisdiction, therefore man-
dating screening of the Haitians for potential refugees under
section 243 of the INA.277
Justice Blackmun claimed the majority understated the sig-
nificance of the INA amendments, removing "within the United
States" to create a unique meaning for "return."27' The dissent
argued that "within the United States" referred only to individu-
als physically present in the United States. 79 Justice Blackmun
did not agree with the majority's holding that the phrase re-
ferred to exclusion proceedings and the decision in Leng May
Ma.2s0 According to Justice Blackmun's analysis, the Refugee
turning him back after he had crossed the frontier, or even of expelling him
after he had been admitted to residence in the territory, the problem was
more or less the same. Whatever the case might be... he must not be turned
back to a country where his life or freedom could be threatened. No consider-
ation of public order should be allowed to overrule that guarantee, for if the
State concerned wished to get rid of the refugee at all costs, it could sent him
to another country or place him in an internment camp.'
Id. at 2572 n.6. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness
and Related Problems, Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting, U.N.Doc. E/
AC.32/SR.20 PP54, 55, 11-12 (1950)).
273. Id. at 2572 (footnote omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
274. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2573 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2575.
279. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2575 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
280. Id.; see supra notes 234-36 (discussing Leng Ma May); see also supra notes 80-89
and accompanying text (describing exclusion proceedings).
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Act of 1980 confirmed that section 243(h) (1) of the INA applies
to the high seas.2 8 ' The Justice further pointed out that the INA
clearly designates geographical locations in other sections when
a limited geographic designation was intended, 2  The absence
of such a reference in section 243(1) (h), therefore, indicates
that the section applies both in and outside of the United
States. 3
Overall, Justice Blackmun found the majority's theory im-
plausible and overly reliant on the presumption against extrater-
ritorial construction. 84 He concluded that the majority misused
the presumption in this case because Congress intended to pro-
vide for extraterritorial application. 85 Furthermore, Justice
Blackmun believed that the legislation was expressly interna-
tional, rather than exclusively directed to events occurring
within the United States alone. 8 6
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S MYOPIC HOLDING IN SALE
IGNORES THE 1967 PROTOCOL & INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The 1951 Convention is ambiguous on the issue of extrater-
ritorial effect. Due to the limited nature of the 1951 Conven-
tion, this ambiguity should be construed against extraterritorial
application.28 7 The 1967 Protocol, however, altered the charac-
ter of the 1951 Convention and created a more universal and
flexible instrument for protecting refugees.2 8 While the 1967
281. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. Id. (referring to 8 U.S.C. §§ 207-08 containing designations "overseas and
.physically present in the United States, or at a land border or entry port."). AsJustice
Blackmun stated: Such designations indicate that "[w] hen Congress wanted a provision
to apply only to aliens 'physically present in the United States .... ' it said so." Id. at
2575 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted).
284. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2576 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 2576-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
287. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text (describing Convention's his-
tory). When the 1951 Convention was promulgated, the drafters did not intend its non-
refoulement provision to be applied extraterritorially. See supra note 22 (quoting Arti-
cle 33 with non-refoulement provision). Furthermore, the 1951 Convention's limited
purpose and scope precluded such a construction. See supra note 41 (quoting preamble
of 1951 Convention).
288. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (explaining 1967 Protocol).
1994] 1099
1100 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:1062
Protocol created the option of extraterritorial application, it
does not require it.289 That uncertainty can be resolved by apply-
ing the customary international law of human rights, which
evinces a duty to avoid aiding or abetting human rights viola-
tors.290 The U.S. program to repatriate all Haitians, regardless
of their refugee claims, violates this duty because it sends refu-
gees back to face the same persecution they initially sought to
escape. 291 Furthermore, the United States' conduct and the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision set a dangerous international prece-
dent.
A. The 1951 Convention Does Not Apply Extraterritorially
When interpreting the 1951 Convention, the Supreme
Court, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., relied heavily on the
negotiating history of the 1951 Convention.292 The Court's reli-
ance on the ad hoc committee's records, however, was misplaced
because the records were equally ambiguous.293 Extraterritorial
application is not discussed at any point in the negotiating his-
tory.294 As the majority noted, with understatement, "[t] he nego-
289. Id.
290. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (describing customary interna-
tional law of human rights).
291. See supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text (detailing human rights condi-
tions in Haiti).
292. See supra notes 262-67 (discussing Court's reliance on negotiating history).
293. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting Persecutors: The Seizure and Re-
turn of Haitian Refugees in Violation of the U.N. Refugee Convention and Protocol, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 67, 82-83 (1993) (indicating that conduct and form of minutes raise more
questions than they answer).
294. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2562-63, 65
(1993). See Eastern 111 S. Ct. at 1498 (declining to adopt an interpretation of "lesion
corporelle" in Warsaw Convention because there was "no evidence that the drafters or
signatories ... specifically considered" such an application). The Swiss and Dutch rep-
resentatives, on whom the government and the majority relied, only objected to an
obligation to "allow large groups of persons... to cross [their] frontiers." Sale, 113 S.
Ct. at 2566. That does not relate to extraterritorial application. While the majority
chose to construe as creating a 'general consensus' the statements of van Boetzelaer
and his report of conversations with an unknown number of other delegates, his state-
ments were merely "placed on the record" without objection whereas others were
"agreed to" or "adopted." See supra notes 262-67 (explaining majority's use of negotiat-
ing history); Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2572 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun
observed,
It should not be assumed that other delegates agreed with the comment sim-
ply because they did not object to their colleague's request to memorialize it
.... All that can be said is that at one time Baron van Boetzelaer remarked
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tiating history... is not dispositive."295
If the Court had relied more heavily on the historical con-
text in which the 1951 Convention was drafted,296 the Court
would not have reached the inadequately supported conclusion
that the drafters expressly considered and rejected extraterrito-
rial application.29 7 The history of the 1951 Convention and the
that 'he had gathered' that there was a general consensus, and that his inter-
pretation was placed on record.
Id.
295. Sa, 113 S. Ct. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. See Eastern, 111 S. Ct. at 1502 (using historical context in which Warsaw Con-
vention was drafted.)
297. See supra notes 245-67 and accompanying text (presenting Court's holding).
While the Court's decision was partially correctly in holding that the 1951 Convention
did not apply extraterritorially, the reasoning by which the Court reached that conclu-
sion was flawed. First, the Court ignored the traditional method of analyzing the text of
a treaty. The Court, instead, looked to Article 33(2), the INA, and an old immigration
case to give the 1951 Convention meaning. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563 ("Article 33.1
uses the words 'expel or return ('refouler')' as an obvious parallel to the words 'deport
or return' in § 243(h)(1).").
The Court cannot accurately interpret the drafters' intent by using a U.S. statute
and a U.S. case which post-date the 1951 Convention. See Eastern, 111 S. Ct. at 1495
(declining to interpret French term in the Warsaw Convention using cases decided af-
ter Convention was drafted). Leng May Ma was decided in 1958 and 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h),
66 Stat. 214 ("Withholding of deportation or return") was enacted in 1952. It is highly
unlikely that the policies on which these sources were based were the same as those
used by the drafters of the 1951 Convention. Eastern, 111 S. Ct. at 1495. As Justice
Blackmun observed in dissent, the majority was "reasoning backwards" by looking to the
American scheme to illuminate the Treaty. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2575 n.13 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting).
Second, the Court failed to fully consider the plain meaning of the text before
seeking to create another meaning. Such an examination would have provided a
stronger basis for the Court's subsequent steps. Id. at 2563-64; supra notes 245-67 and
accompanying text. As the Supreme Court noted, "return" is modified by "the paren-
thetical reference to "refouler," a French word that is not an exact synonym for the
English word "return." Sal, 113 S. Ct. at 2563-64. Although the Vienna Convention
indicates that the Court could find a special interpretation of a term where they can
establish that the drafters so intended, the Court over-relied on dictionary translations
of the text which merely highlighted the 1951 Convention's ambiguity rather than
resolving it. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31(4), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8
I.L.M. at 692.
Further, the phrase "at a border," as used in the Court's definition, does not neces-
sarily follow from the translations selected. See supra note 258 and accompanying text
(explaining Court's definition of "refouler"); Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2564; see also supra note
257 and accompanying text (explaining the dictionary translations on which the Court
relied). One can be repulsed, repelled or driven back from any point, including on the
high seas, not necessarily at a border. See Sal, 113 S. Ct. at 2569-70 (Blackmun, j.,
dissenting). The dictionary translations do not resolve the ambiguity of the text nor do
they merit the reliance that the majority placed in them.
However, despite this lapse, the Court correctly found that the parties intended to
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context in which it was concluded show that the drafters simply
never addressed the extraterritorial application of the 1951 Con-
vention. 298 The ad hoc committee did not address such an appli-
cation, because the refugee movements to which the committee
was reacting were products of World War II, and thus, within
Europe, across land borders, and did not involve any extraterri-
torial areas. 99
The treaty's references to "events occurring in Europe"
highlight the focus of the committee's intentions.0 0 The pream-
ble of the 1951 Convention also indicates the Convention's lim-
ited purpose.3 0 ' The statement of intent in the preamble indi-
cates that the agreement was to be merely an incremental im-
provement over previous agreements. 30 2 While the inter-war
agreements detailed in Article I(A) (1) protected a small group
give "return" a special meaning and that "refouler" was included expressly to "clarify
the non-legal term 'return.' " Stenberg, supra note 4, at 200 (footnote omitted); see
Gluck, supra note 187, at 880 ("('refouler') clouds the plain meaning of the provision").
According to article 33 of the Vienna Convention, "[w]hen a treaty has been authorized
in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language .... The
terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text." Vi-
enna Convention, supra note 60, art. 33, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92. Nota-
bly, while the English text of the 1951 Convention, containing the French word
"refouler," is authentic, the French version does not include an equivalent English lan-
guage parenthetical modifier. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 46, 19 U.S.T.
at 6276, 6281, 189 U.N.T.S. at 177, 184; see also Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2570 n.5 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). This difference indicates that the phrase "return ('refouler')" was " 'not
susceptible to a plain language analysis' "and the Court was correct in using other tools
of interpretation to resolve the ambiguity. McNaiy, 969 F.2d at 1362 (Walker,J., dissent-
ing).
298. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text (presenting history of Conven-
tion indicating failure to address extraterritorial application)
299. Id. "As the terms of the [1951 Convention] indicate, the drafters assumed that
the refugees would be either within the country of refuge or at [its] border."
Schoenholtz, supra note 294, at 75. A noteworthy exception occurred in 1939 when the
United States and Cuba refused to allow the St. Louis, a ship carrying over 930 Jews
fleeing Germany, to dock. Myra MacPherson, The Excluded; Supreme Court Exclusion of
Haitian Refugees, NATION, Apr. 6, 1992, at 436. However, the 1951 Convention, even
under the Supreme Court's limited interpretation, would have prevented the return of
the refugees on board the St. Louis because they were initially rejected from Cuban
territorial waters and were not on the high seas as were the Haitian refugees. Id.
300. See supra note 33 (quoting Article 1 (B)(1) of 1951 Convention).
301. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl., 19 U.S.T. at 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. at
150; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (quoting preamble of 1951 Conven-
tion); Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. at
691-92 ("The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall ... includ [e]
its preamble.").
302. See supra note 52 (quoting Preamble of 1967 Protocol).
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of specifically named European refugees,"' 3 the drafters of the
1951 Convention intended to expand protection to all refugees
from pre-1951 events.30 4
The 1951 Convention was a narrow, remedial agreement in-
tended to deal with the "result[s] of events occurring before 1
January 1951" in Europe.30 5 The terms of the 1951 Convention
demonstrate that the signatory states were not prepared to ac-
cept open-ended obligations for the indefinite future.306 Over-
all, the political tensions of the late 1940's and early 1950's were
not conducive to an agreement of any greater scope. 0 7 There-
fore, interdiction of refugees on the high seas was not within the
purpose contemplated by the contracting parties .30  Applying
the terms of the 1951 Convention to the Haitians would endow
303. See supra note 37 (showing limitations written into inter-war agreements).
304. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. l(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189
U.N.T.S. at 152.
305. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. l(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S.
at 152.
306. Martin, supra note 188, at 16 n.3. See ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 8 ("The
restrictive nature of [the] stipulations was due mainly to the desire of the framers of the
Convention to reach unanimity in the Conference and not to write a document which
may be ideal in its wording but would not be acceptable to many governments."); see
also 23 INr'L MicRATION REv. 567 (1989) ("To have a fair chance for effective imple-
mentation, [a] norm must not depart too radically from what key political actors are
prepared to accept.") (footnote omitted).
307. See supra note 307 (discussing atmosphere of 1940-1950). The statements
made by the Dutch delegate to the Conference clearly reflect a concern for the Nether-
lands' sovereignty and the integrity of its borders. See supra note 266 (presenting
Baron's statement).
The 1951 Convention was drafted during a period when national sovereignty was a
significant force. David A. Martin, Kurds and Haitians: From Refugee Legalisms to Humani-
tarian Intervention?, 86 AM. Soc. Irr'L. PROC. 623, 629 (1992). Explaining the con-
strained political atmosphere prevalent in 1951 Martin stated:
Moreover - and this is crucial - [the Convention] was adopted at a time
when national sovereignty loomed large .... As a result, in 1951 it seemed
that if the world community were going to act concretely to assist people
threatened ... it would simply have to wait for individuals to cross a national
boundary on their own initiative .... By that point, of course, their treatment
was in the hands of the haven states.
Id.
308. Arthur C. Helton, The United States Government Program of Intercepting and Forci-
bly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Implications and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
HUM. RTs. 325, 329 (1993) ("An exodus by sea was clearly not within [the Dutch dele-
gate's] or the other delegates' contemplation."); Schoenholtz, supra note 294, at 6
('The notion that a contracting state would reach beyond its territory to seize and re-
turn refugees to authorities who would persecute them was unimaginable."); Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (1993) (observing that
'[tihe drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Protocol . . .may not have
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the 1951 Convention with a new purpose and a more flexible
character than originally intended." 9
B. The United States Is Obligated to Protect the Haitian Refugees
Under the 1967 Protocol and International Human
Rights Law
While the Court drew the correct conclusions regarding the
1951 Convention,1 0 the Court erroneously ignored the U.S. ob-
ligation under the 1967 Protocol and international human rights
law.311 The 1967 Protocol and current international human
rights law dictate that refoulement is prohibited on the high
seas. 12 The 1967 Protocol alone makes it possible to extend Ar-
ticle 33 of the 1951 Convention to the high seas, but does not
mandate its extension. This uncertainty can be settled by apply-
ing customary international human rights law, which evinces a
duty to avoid aiding or abetting human rights violators.31 3
1. The 1967 Protocol
The 1967 Protocol altered the basic character of the 1951
contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them to the
one country they had desperately sought to escape").
309. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing method of determining
character of treaties).
310. See supra notes 259-67 and accompanying text (setting forth majority's analy-
sis of 1951 Convention); see also notes 293-300 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's conclusion that 1951 Convention, when considered alone, does not apply extra-
territorially).
311. See ROBERTSON, supra note 94, at 1 ("One of the most striking developments
in international law since the end of the Second World War has been a concern with
the protection of human rights."). Additionally, Robertson and Merrills observed that
[b]etween the first edition of [their] book in 1972 and the second, ten years
later, the importance of human rights in international affairs increased im-
measurably. The United Nations Covenants of 1966 came into force; the Hel-
sinki Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe was concluded; the
American Court of Human Rights was set up and the case law of the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights underwent a rapid and dramatic de-
velopment. In the period since 1982 these advances have been consolidated
and extended and progress had been made on a number of other fronts.
Id. at v. See supra notes 245-67 and accompanying text (presenting court's analysis).
312. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (describing 1967 Protocol); see
also supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (describing international human rights
law).
313. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (explaining international
human rights law).
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Convention. 314 Just as the 1951 Convention was an incremental
step forward from the inter-war agreements, the 1967 Protocol
was a step forward from the 1951 Convention.315 In expanding
the application of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol's pre-
amble points to the development of new refugee problems since
the 1951 Convention was drafted, and the intent to accord equal
status to all migrants fitting the 1951 Convention's definition of
a refugee.316 The United States obligated itself to abide by the
1951 Convention through the 1967 Protocol.317
The drafters of the 1967 Protocol manifested an intent to
broaden the scope of the 1951 Convention sufficiently to encom-
pass future needs. 318 The 1967 Protocol's non-specific reference
to new situations and the elimination of the January 1951 limita-
tion indicate that the treaty sought to extend the protections set
forth in the 1951 Convention.319 In addition, the 1967 Proto-
col's wording suggests that the protections asserted in the 1951
Convention should no longer be considered in their original
context.32 0 Though the 1967 Protocol broadens the ambit of
where Article 33 may be applied, it does not answer the question
of whether Article 33 extends to the high seas. While the 1967
Protocol created the option of extraterritorial application, it
does not require it."' The flexible character of the 1967 Proto-
col, however, when given a good faith interpretation in the con-
314. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (explaining how 1967 Protocol
altered 1951 Convention).
315. Id.; see supra note 18 (quoting 1967 Protocol).
316. Id., 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268; see supra note 52 (quoting Pream-
ble to 1967 Protocol).
317. 1968 Protocol, supra note 19, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 649 U.N.T.S. 372.
318. MARTIN, supra note 188, at 16 n.3. Under the 1951 Convention, the defini-
tion of refugee was limited
to those who were outside their home countries owing to a well-founded fear
of persecution as a result of events occurring beforeJanuary 1, 1951 - a strong
sign that the participating governments were not prepared to take on open-
ended obligations for the indefinite future. By 1967, this concern had dimin-
ished, and a Protocol to the Convention was drafted removing the dateline
limitation and thus converting the treaty to one with more universal scope.
Id. (citations omitted).
319. See supra note 52 (quoting Preamble of 1967 Protocol); see also supra notes 49-
54 and accompanying text (describing effect of 1967 Protocol on 1951 Convention).
320. See Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993, 996-97
(5th Cir. 1977) (noting that 1967 Protocol represented departure from attitudes preva-
lent in 1950's); supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text (describing 1951 Conven-
tion's protections and original context).
321. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (describing 1967 Protocol).
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text of international human rights law, suggests that the treaty
should apply on the high seas.322
The Supreme Court should have interpreted the 1967 Pro-
tocol in light of the changes from the 1951 Convention. 3  Ac-
cording to the Vienna Convention, a treaty should be inter-
preted in good faith and in accordance with the plain meaning
of its terms.32 4 The terms must be considered in their context
and in light of the treaty's object and purpose. 325 The object
and purpose of the 1967 Protocol was to widen the ambit of the
1951 Convention.
2. International Law of Human Rights Protection
and Non-refoulement
The Court should have resolved the ambiguity in the 1951
Convention by taking into account customary international
human rights law.126 According to the Vienna Convention, the
Court should have taken into account the customary interna-
tional law of human rights when interpreting an agreement. 327
The modern state of human rights law dictates that non-refoule-
ment extend to refugees on the high seas. 28
Refoulement contributes to human rights violations be-
cause it entails delivering refugees into the hands of those com-
mitting the violations.329 Under customary international law,
states have a duty to avoid aiding and abetting human rights vio-
lations.33 ' Therefore, because the Haitians' human rights are
322. See supra notes 55-69, 108-19 and accompanying text (discussing interpreta-
tion of international treaty and international human rights law).
323. See Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 996-97 (observing that 1967 Protocol changed how
refoulement and section 243(h) (1) of the INA were to be considered); supra notes 49-
54 and accompanying text (describing how 1967 Protocol affected 1951 Convention).
324. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M. 691-
92.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (describing customary interna-
tional law).
327. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31(3)(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8
I.L.M. at 691-92.
328. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (explaining international law of
human rights).
329. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing problems refugees
face).
330. Schoenholtz, supra note 294, at 11.
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often violated when they are returned to Haiti,"'1 the United
States is barred, pursuant to the customary international law of
human rights, 332 from returning the interdicted refugees to Ha-
iti. The Court's decision permits the United States to violate its
international obligations under international human rights
law.3 33
3. Obligation to Avoid Aiding and Abetting
Human Rights Violations
Under customary international law, the United States is ob-
ligated to avoid actions supporting or enabling violations of rec-
ognized human rights.3 3 4 The contemporary international law
of human rights evinces general acceptance of the idea that all
individuals have rights that the state must recognize, respect,
and ensure. 3 5 The duty to avoid measures that enable third par-
ties to violate human rights is generally accepted and is opinio
juris as required for the duty to be customary international
law.3
3 6
a. General Acceptance
The widespread acknowledgement of a duty to avoid assist-
ing human rights violations is manifest by U.S. national legisla-
tion,337 international agreements, including the Convention
331. See supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text (describing human rights con-
ditions in Haiti).
332. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (presenting international
human rights law).
333. See supra notes 242-67 and accompanying text (discussing Court's decision).
334. See, e.g., Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia
and Montenegro)), 1993 LC.J. 3, 24 (Interim Protection Order of Apr. 8) (ordering
Yugoslavia to ensure that its military does not commit genocide as well as ordering both
party-governments to avoid acts enabling commission of genocide or extension of dis-
pute at issue). See also supra notes 97-115 (discussing protected rights).
335. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 26, Introduction to ch. 3, prt. VII; see supra
note 26 and accompanying text (presenting general acceptance of individuals' rights).
336. See supra notes 116-19 (discussing how a duty becomes customary interna-
tional law).
337. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), 262d-1, 2151n(a) (requiring abstention from behav-
ior that would assist nations violating human rights); 7 U.S.C.§ 1733(0 (requiring ab-
stention from behavior that would assist nations violating human rights); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 635(b) (1) (B), 635i-8(c) (4) (requiring abstention from behavior that would assist na-
tions violating human rights); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2432(a), 2439(a) (requiring abstention
from behavior that would assist nations violating human rights).
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Against Torture, 38 and numerous international extradition trea-
ties. 339 The United States government already acknowledges an
obligation to avoid actions supporting or aiding a nation with a
poor human rights record. Such acknowledgement is manifest
in numerous U.S. statutes, requiring that the U.S. government
take into account human rights considerations.3 40 For example,
Title 22, Subchapter II, entitled "Military Assistance and Sales,"
requires that the United States observe human rights as a princi-
ple goal of external policy.34 1 Chapter 7, "International Bureaus,
Congresses, Etc." of the same title, and Title 7, Chapter 41, "Ag-
ricultural Trade Development and Assistance," also demonstrate
the same obligation by prohibiting the United States from aiding
countries known to violate human rights.3 42
In addition to U.S. domestic law, extradition treaties and
the Convention Against Torture also demonstrate general ac-
ceptance of the duty to avoid acts that enable third parties to
violate human rights.343 International observance of human
rights is specifically demonstrated in extradition treaties. 44
Most bilateral extradition agreements prohibit extradition for
political offenses 34 or offenses for which the extraditee would
be subject to capital punishment in the requesting State but not
in the requested State.346 Such provisions demonstrate accept-
338. Convention Against Torture, supra note 98.
339. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (explaining extradition trea-
ties).
340. See supra note 97 (citing sections of United States Code requiring abstention
from behavior that would assist nations violating human rights).
341. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1993); see supra note 97 (explaining section 2304(a)).
342. See supra note 97 (describing provisions of United States Code barring United
States from aiding countries that violate human rights).
343. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing extradition treaties
and Convention Against Torture).
344. See supra note 105 (discussing extradition treaties). Although the Supreme
Court in Sale distinguished aliens within U.S territory from those who, like the Haitians,
are beyond it, for the purpose of demonstrating international law, the two are analo-
gous. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -_, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-61 (1993).
An individual facing extradition is within U.S. territory where extradition treaties apply
but is also, like a refugee, under the control and jurisdiction of a government and is
facing return to a foreign territory. See BLACK's LAw DIcrioNARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).
Extradition is defined as "[t] he surrender by one.., country to another of an individual
accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territorial
jurisdiction of the other." Id.
345. See supra note 108 (indicating frequent use of political offense exception).
346. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (providing examples of extradition
treaties that include political and capital punishment exceptions). The term 'request-
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ance of the duty to avoid delivering an individual to a potential
persecutor.
The Convention Against Torture also contains a non-
refoulement provision in Article 3(1)."4' Notably, the inclusion
of non-refoulement in the Convention Against Torture34 is an-
other indication of how the duty has been generally accepted.
The use of non-refoulement in the Convention Against Torture
also specifically demonstrates how the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention is not in accordance
with how non-refoulement is now used to protect refugees from
human rights violations. 49 Article 3(1) of the Convention
Against Torture uses the phrase "return ('refouler')" and is very
similar to Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, 5 0 thus present-
ing a useful parallel to illustrate the inadequacy of the Supreme
Court's interpretation.
Because the 1951 Convention and the Convention Against
Torture use the phrase "return ('refouler')" in the same way, the
phrase should have the same definition in the context of both
treaties. The Supreme Court defined "return ('refouler')" as "a
defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border. ' 35 1 Using
the Court's definition from Sale, "return ('refouler')" in Article 3
of the Convention Against Torture should be construed to pro-
tect only refugees within state territory.5 2 Other articles of the
Convention Against Torture, however, indicate that it also ap-
plies beyond state territory and suggest that the Supreme Court's
definition is incorrect. Article 3(2) of the Convention Against
Torture is different from its analog, Article 33(2) of the 1951
Convention. The Supreme Court, in part, based its interpreta-
tion of "return ('refouler')" on Article 33(2)'s reference to in-
country refugees.3 53 Article 3(2) of the Convention Against Tor-
ing State" refers to country making the extradition request. SWEENEY, supra note 62, at
146. The term "requested State" refers to the country receiving the extradition request.
Id.
347. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (setting forth non-refoulement
provision of Convention Against Torture).
348. Id.
349. Convention Against Torture, supra note 98.
350. See supra note .107 (quoting Article 3 of Convention Against Torture).
351. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (1993)
352. Id.
353. See supra notes 22, 259-61 and accompanying text (presenting text and
Court's analysis of Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention).
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ture does not include the language on which the Court relied.354
In light of the identical use of "return ('refouler') in the Con-
vention Against Torture, the lack of a similar reference removes
some of the basis for using the Court's definition, because the
reference could not have been relevant to the phrase's meaning
in the Convention Against Torture.
Furthermore, while the Court in Sale based its findings on
the lack of textual reference to extraterritorial application,355
Article 5(1) (a) of the Convention Against Torture specifically
commands that State Parties establish jurisdiction over acts com-
mitted in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board any ves-
sel registered in that country.356 The general reference to ves-
sels, in addition to "territory under its jurisdiction," indicates
that signatories are bound by the treaty no matter where a pro-
scribed act occurs, including the high seas.357 Such a construc-
tion is appropriate given that torture and other human rights
violations are no more permissible if conducted outside national
territory.358 Furthermore, an interpretation of the Convention
Against Torture and "return ('refouler')" that grants jurisdiction
over acts on the high seas, but does not prohibit refoulement on
the high seas, would be "absurd. 3 9
Because the Convention Against Torture clearly contem-
plates that State responsibility extend to the high seas, and be-
cause the text does not otherwise expressly limit Article 3(1) to
state territory, the Supreme Court's territorial definition of
refoulement violates Article 3(1) of the Convention Against Tor-
354. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 98, art. 3, 23 I.L.M. at 151, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/39/L.40, at 4.
355. See supra notes 262, 263-67 and accompanying text (discussing Court's inter-
pretation of 1951 Convention).
356. Convention Against Torture, supra note 98, art. 5, 23 I.L.M. at 150, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/39/L.40 at 4 ("offenses which are committed in any territory under its jurisdic-
tion or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State.").
357. Id. The Article 2 duty to 'prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction" presumably binds states in regard to ships and aircraft as well. See id., art.
2, 23 I.L.M. at 150-51, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/L.40, at 4. To restrict the duty to prevent to
land only while mandating establishment ofjurisdiction on the seas and in the air after
the act is committed would be inconsistent.
358. See ROBERT BLAc:KBuRN &JOHN TAYLOR, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 1990's 25-26
(1991).
359. See Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340, 8 I.L.M.
at 692 (recommending "supplementary means of interpretation" to avoid an "absurd or
unreasonable" result).
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ture.s t ° Consequently, the identical use of "return ('refouler')
in Article 3(1) and Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention poses a
distinct problem for which the most likely explanation is that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of "return ('refouler')" and the
1967 Protocol were incomplete. 6'
The Court in Sale found that the 1951 Convention's text
demonstrates that the 1951 Convention was not intended to
have extraterritorial effect.36 2 The negotiating history and the
point in time during which the 1951 Convention was promul-
gated, however, indicate that, instead, the parties merely did not
contemplate extraterritorial effect. 363 Prior to the 1967 Proto-
col, the Court's interpretation of the 1951 Convention would
have been sufficient to reach a decision.364 The United States'
accession to the 1967 Protocol, the development of the modern
human rights regime, and the world's increased experience with
refugees, however, suggest that the Court should have looked
beyond the 1951 Convention.
b. Opinio Juris
Nations have a "legal obligation"363 to avoid assisting human
rights violations. This duty is reflected by the judgments ren-
dered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez
Rodrigez366 and the European Court of Human Rights in Soering
v. United Kingdom,367 as well as the holdings in a 1987 extradi-
tion case from the Supreme Constitutional Court of Germany36"
and in Kindler v. Canada from the Supreme Court of Canada. In
all four cases, the courts recognized that governments have a
360. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (setting forth Supreme Court's def-
inition).
361. See supra notes 268-87 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's
dissent and criticism of majority's interpretation of 1951 Convention).
362. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (1993).
363. See supra notes 33-48, 293-310 and accompanying text (discussing negotiating
history of 1951 Convention).
364. See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text (presenting Court's interpreta-
tion).
365. See supra note 117 (describing opiniojuris).
366. Arthur Helton, The Malaysian Policy to Redirect Vietnamese Boat People: Non-
refoulement as a Human Rights Remedy, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1203, 1212 (1992)
[hereinafter Malaysian Policy].
367. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (setting forth facts in Soering).
368. Judgement of Mar. 31, 1987, BVerfG, 1987 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
[NJWI 2155 (F.D.R.).
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duty to refrain from otherwise non-culpable conduct where such
acts would enable someone else to violate human rights. In Ve-
lasquez, the Inter-American Court noted that state conduct can
infringe upon human rights without being the direct cause of
the violation. 69 Though Soering, the German case, and Kindler
involved extradition, rather than the interdiction and return of a
refugee, the cases are nevertheless analogous. In all four cases
the courts demonstrated that conditions in the receiving country
are relevant to whether an individual should be returned.370
The controlling factor in Velasquez, Soering, the German
case, and Kindler is the principle forbidding nations from delib-
erately exposing an individual to a risk of a human rights viola-
tion.371 This principle is already acknowledged and accepted
when applied to the non-refoulement of individuals within state
territory.3 72 Given that the focus of non-refoulement is on keep-
ing the refugee out of a perilous situation, the necessary conclu-
sion is that the general principles of human rights would "en-
hance the ambit of protection provided under [the principle of]
non-refoulement." 373
369. See supra notes 121-25 (presenting Velasquez Judgement).
370. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (setting forth facts of Soering).
Although U.S. courts defer such determinations to the Secretary of State, such condi-
tions are taken into account, albeit at the extradition treaty making phase. See Ahmad
v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1990). Although the decisions from interna-
tional courts such as the International Court of Justice, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights are clearly indicative of cus-
tomary international law, their decisions are not binding on all nations. See supra note
335 (presenting example of an International Court of Justice order reflecting duty to
avoid acts contributing to human rights violations). The United States, specifically, has
signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights which established
the Inter-American Court, therefore the United States is not legally bound by the
court's judgements. Mary C. Parker, 'Other Treaties:' The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights Defines its Advisoy Jurisdiction, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 211, 213 (1983); see supra note 122
(discussing structure of Inter-American Court). The United States has also been reluc-
tant to abide by decisions of the International Court of Justice. See, e.g., Richard B.
Bilder, The Brendan Brown Lecture: The U.S. & the World Court in the Post-"Cold War" Era,
40 CATH. U. L. REv. 251 (1991) (discussing U.S. position toward International Court of
Justice). However, among other nations, opinions from international courts are ac-
corded considerable respect. Parker, supra note 370, at 217.
371. Malaysian Policy, supra note 366, at 1213.
372. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176, 8 I.L.M. at 6276.
373. Malaysian Policy, supra note 366, at 1217; see Arthur Helton, REFUGEES, July
1992, at 40 ("Repatriation should be promoted only if there is no longer a likelihood of
recurrence of the human rights abuses that precipitated flight."); see also RESTATEMENT
(THnwa), supra note 26, § 701 cmt. c. (observing that human rights "agreements are for
the benefit of individuals ... subject to the jurisdiction of the promisor state.").
SALE V HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL
As shown by the aforementioned cases, U.S. statutory provi-
sions, and contemporary human rights agreements, states con-
sider it their duty under customary international law to safe-
guard human rights. 74 This duty applies without regard to geo-
graphical location. 75 The ambit of non-refoulement, therefore,
must include refugees found on the high seas. Refoulement
from international waters constitutes as great a violation of ac-
knowledged norms as would refoulement from within Europe.376
C. A Powerful International Precedent
While the current level of emigration from Haiti may be a
temporary phenomenon primarily affecting the U.S., the
Supreme Court's decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
could have broader ramifications.377 State practice is a vital com-
ponent in the development of customary international law and
in the interpretation of international agreements. 378 Therefore,
the two years during which the policy was in effect will influence
other nations analyzing the customary international law of
human rights.
According to the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, the United States is the only nation ever
to reach beyond its territorial waters and seize possible refugees
for the sole purpose of returning them to the state from which
they fled.37' Furthermore, the Supreme Court's holding in Sale
is the sole judicial opinion on the issue of whether refugees on
the high seas may be returned to their persecutors. Thus, this
decision has the appearance of being dispositive. Finally, the
United States' political power is quite significant internation-
ally. 8 ' Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision may serve as an
374. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (presenting customary interna-
tional law of human rights).
375. See BLAcKBuRN, supra note 359, at 25-26.
376. See supra note 22 (presenting text of Article 33 of 1951 Convention which
expressly prohibits refoulement of refugees within Europe).
377. See supra notes 182, 243-65 and accompanying text (describing emigration
and majority's decision).
378. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 63Q F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820); The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900)).
379. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., - U.S.
-, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (92-344) 11, available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
380. Indonesia Signs Agreement to Return Boat People, Nov. 8, 1993, Reuters, available
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influential international precedent. This opinion may hold
greater significance for foreign courts and governments examin-
ing the issue than will the United States' current policy, because
it more directly addresses the question of whether the 1951 Con-
vention applies on the high seas. In the future, this may lead
other countries, facing a mass migration to their shores, to emu-
late the Haitian interdiction program."8 '
CONCLUSION
By refouling all Haitian immigrants without identifying
those immigrants who are refugees, the United States is expos-
ing persecuted Haitians to continued torture, arbitrary deten-
tion, and other forms of persecution.8 2 As a mechanism to en-
sure compliance with the 1967 Protocol, the INA, and the per-
emptory norm of human rights protection, the Supreme Court
should have recognized that non-refoulement is now mandated
on the high seas just as it has been on land. Both the United
States' behavior and the Supreme Court's holding make a signif-
icant statement to other nations in similar situations. However,
other nations should recognize that neither statement reflects
the proper treatment of refugees. Consequently, they can not
be a basis for replicating U.S. actions. No refugees, regardless of
where they are found, may be returned to the land they have
fled.
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